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INLUCETUA
It latter than you think
It probably is the case that there are some places
where life is lived closer to the surface than in others. In
New Orleans, life is lived close to the surface. Maybe it's
because they have to wear fewer clothes, and thus spend
more time uncovered literally, but New Orleanians seem to
my northern sensibilities to get all the deep stuff right up
there where you can see it.
Pleasure-sure, everybody knows that the city now
called the Big Easy encourages the enjoyment of all sorts of
pleasures. Even the lowly food is good, and the good food
makes you think that eating must have been what God
invented people to do. "Tov, tov," he must have said, at
his post-creation feast, cleaning the last of the shrimp
creole off his plate with a hard roll, and thinking about
whether the cannolli or the bananas Foster should finish
off the meal. And sex? well, judging by the public
advertisments, it seems to be available on the same sort of
scale as food, and for all I know gets rated by numbers of
stars in a published guide.
But on this visit I was struck by the way religious life,
too, is public and visible-talked about and passed around
and shouted and handed on and lived out in spaces where
everybody sees. Waiting for the streetcar-itself an
experience of common, public life lived openly -1 was
preached at, or preached to in a remarkable way. Two
street preachers worked the large crowd waiting for the car
at about 6:30 in the evening at the foot of Canal Street.
They had two different styles, both earnest and energetic,
but neither one angry or hostile. Both were middle-aged
black men, both carried Bibles. One spoke loudly, urging
people to invite Jesus into their lives. He said that he
didn't want anybody to leave a church to follow him, or to
give him anything, but simply to renew a commitment
made to love and serve the Lord. The other spoke to
individual people, face-to-face, low-voiced and intense,
asking them to turn away from any wrong-doing in their
lives, and commit themselves to love God and serve their
neighbors in response to the loving sacrifice ofJesus.
Most of the crowd ignored them; this was a week
night, and the group consisted almost entirely of people
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going home from work, and only a few were tourists like
me. When we had all got onto the car, the two men stood
together on the sidewalk, and concluded their service.
They prayed down blessings on the occasion, and then
they asked us to wave at them if we had been blessed.
My northern, Lutheran, white, repressed, tastefully
private self struggled. I could actually feel one of my hands
holding the other one down in my lap. But I got it free,
and waved to them-face to face-acknowledging the
blessing. And, waving there from the streetcar, still feeling
foolish because almost nobody else waved, and absolutely
nobody else white waved (was I breaking some kind of
racial taboo? do only black people respond to black
preaching?) I did feel that I was experiencing my faith,
doing my believing in this nearly unaccountably odd public
way. And I did feel blessed.
Next day, from a taxi stopped at a light, I saw a sign
painted on a wall, its message so arresting that I wrote it
down. The white painted words were
It latter than you think
Jesus comming soon
Repent. Please.
Since then, I've thought about this message a great
deal, and pondered what it means about our people, our
cities, our culture. Someone cared a great deal about the
well-being of unknown others in his city. Someone got a
can of white paint, found the right size brush, and went out
into the city, determined to find places to put a message. I
suppose it is against the law to put one's own messages up
in paint on someone else's property, though the painter
had been careful, I thought, to find an unused billboard
near ground level on an abandoned building, so the
message didn't actually deface anything.
One of the striking things about the message is that
no one would have looked twice to see a nearly naked
woman seductively urging the public to buy a certain brand
3
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of vodka, but this message is unauthorized, not bought or
sold, and not about buying or selling, and so its 'public'
nature seems peculiar, almost shocking, nearly indecent.
Why does the writer make mistakes in grammar and
spelling? Well, perhaps that's because he or she is not a
native speaker. Perhaps. Or, just as likely, that being poor,
or black, or poor and black, this much correctness is the
best she can do? And why is it that we should assume that a
religious message painted on a wall has been put there by a
poor person? What connections are automatic and why? I
suppose partly because we know that if a well-t<Hlo person
had wanted to convey an important religious message, she
would have contributed to the appropriate agency to put
the appropriately tasteful (and correctly spelled) ad in a
newspaper. And when did you see the most recent of
those?
"Repent. Please." It is so urgent, and so humble. The
directness disarms. People who study discourse would
notice right away how unusual is the "please" in the context
of religious zealotry. The short message ends with an
appeal we almost pass over because we hear it all the time,
though we rarely hear it said by those who do religious talk
for us. Usually, people say 'please' when they want
something for themselves; this messenger wants us please to
do something vital for ourselves. Yet this message occupies
a space tentatively, tolerated only briefly by the power of
ownership, and dismissible by almost every authority that
we recognize.
How grateful Christians ought to be for the wideness
of possibility in Christian expression! In Advent I will hear
any number of powerful expressions concerning the
coming Savior. And I will appreciate those sermons, and
the anthems, antiphons, psalms and prayers, as well as the
symbolic representations of them in wreaths, candles and
even calendars. They are my religious tradition, and they
address me familiarly, calling me to remember in the
rhythm of my own history what Advent and the coming of
the Savior means.
Yet I consider myself to have been most blessed, this
year, by a person with a can of white paint.
Peace,
GME

About this issue
Mind and body, spirit, self, self alone and self with
others-these perpetually absorbing topics permeate this
month's issue. We are particularly pleased to have several
poems by the distinguished poet Robert Siegel this month,
providing in poetic form more commentary on the same set of
topics as those considered by writers in prose. We regret that
the promised piece by Edward Santurri of St. Olaf has been
delayed, not through his fault but because of technical
difficulties beyond our control. It will come later. Meanwhile,
enjoy the bounty here, and look forward to Weinhorst and
Wangerin in December, and-while we're thinking of it, why
not give The Cresset as a present to someone whose intelligence
you respect and enjoy? You send us the name and address,
we'll send a notice to them and a bill to you. What could be
easier?

Aphid
A bottle filled with the green ocean
rocking in windy tides above us,
it has fallen to this clear depth
with one mission, an avatar of trees.
It stumbles among the hairs on my arm
then climbs my wrist. I lift it to the bark
to crawl upward again to those windy reachesthis one who has risked everything
on a sudden descent
and slow, laborious return.
In those floating pastures it draws life
from the ground it walks on.
In that place there is a motion and a stillness
and singing to an unheard music
is its sweet and constnt occupationin that shining atmosphere
where green pastures give water and float
at rest on the air.

Robert Siegel
4
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PROTECTION WITHOUT PUNISHMENT:
FINDING COMMON GROUND ON ABORTION

Richard Stith

There is good news and bad news regarding the
formidable question posed for us today, "Abortion: Can We
Overcome Polarization?" The good news is that, as a
teacher of comparative law, I can assure you that it is highly
unlikely that our nation will end up at either "pole" of the
abortion debate. Almost all other developed Western
nations have occupied some sort of middle position
between absolute equality for unborn children and
absolute freedom for pregnant women. And surveys
indicate that a solid majority of Americans rejects these
poles and endorses both some legal protection for the
preborn and some decriminalization of abortion . Were it
not for Roe v. Wade, the now weakened 1973 U.S.
Supreme Court case that announced a fundamental right
to abortion throughout pregnancy, we would today
probably be quite similar to our world neighbors. By
removing the possibility of compromise, that case gave our
abortion debate (at least temporarily) a tragically strident
and extremist cast.
The bad news is that mere compromise legislation
may not be enough to restore the civility and mutual
respect needed in a democratic polity. As long as abortion
is viewed as a zero-sum game, in which gain for one side is
always loss for the other, a brooding hostility must remain
even after compromise-much like the line of truce
Richard Stith is a Professar of Law at the Valparaiso University
School of Law. He received his J.D., and Ph.D., at Yale
University; This article is a slightly modified version of a
presentation to a National Colloquium at Ohio-Wesleyan
University on the topic mentioned in the first sentence of the article.
Much of the material cited by the author is from the background
text used by colloquium participants, "The Battle Over Abortion:
Seeking Common Ground in a Divided Nation," edited by Keith
Melville, Public Agenda Foundation/Kettering Foundation,
National Issues Forum Institute (Dubuque, Iowa: Kendall/Hunt
Publishing Company, 1990).
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between, say, North and South Korea. As long as one side
seems to care only about women and the other side only
about fetuses, the shared values necessary for a sense of
community are lacking.
But is the above caricature correct? Is it true that
neither side shares the deepest concerns of the other? I
want to argue that it is not. I think that each side
profoundly misinterprets the other, at least in part because
each assumes that the other operates on a principle which
it does not really hold. Each mistakenly assumes that the
other believes this: that protection for the unborn
necessarily requires criminalizing the choice to abort.
In what follows I try first to demonstrate how this
assumption has led to tragic misunderstandings and ill will
on both sides. I then seek to show that the assumption may
be fallacious. There are many non-criminal ways to protect
unborn children, without punishing women who have
chosen abortion. By joining together in common pursuit of
these other measures, we can hope at least to raise the level
of public discourse on abortion-and perhaps even
someday to resolve our national dilemma to the satisfaction
of most of us.

Misunderstanding Pro-Life
Why do pro-life people have such a negative image in
our national media? After all, in their own eyes, they are
simply trying to protect the defenseless. Why are they not
thought of as high-minded and self-sacrificing idealists,
even by those who disagree with them? That is the way
pacifists, for example, are generally viewed by those who
support just war-as misguided yes, but not as ignoble.
The answer, I think, lies at least in part in the fact that
when pro-life people say "Protect unborn children," others
hear "Punish women." Pro-lifers think they speak only out
oflove, but pro-choicers think they sense an accusatory and
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vindictive-spirit that wants to stigmatize desperate women
as criminals. In other words, pro-choicers assume the
supposed entailment mentioned above-that wanting to
protect the unborn necessarily means wanting to penalize
women who abort
But is this a fair inference? In the spring of 1989, the
National Right to Life Committee took a stand officially
opposing any and all punishment of women who have
abortions. And the model bill which this group (by far the
largest on the pro-life side) backed in Idaho would have
decriminalized abortion entirely, for the physician as well
as for the pregnant woman. Instead of criminal penalties,
the bill would have used civil injunctions to limit abortion,
and would have empowered women more easily to sue for
damages for injuries received. Idaho demonstrates clearly,
to my mind, that the pro life mainstream is interested
solely in protecting unborn children and not in labeling
mothers or doctors as "criminals." Women who have had
abortions but later come to regret their decisions and to be
actively pro-life also attest to the fact that they find a
welcome rather than a scolding along their new friends.
Moreover, pro-life people in general are not
indifferent to the plight of the women who feel trapped by
pregnancy. Witness the thousands of pre- and post-natal
help centers staffed by pro-life volunteers without
government assistance. Pro-lifers, however, genuinely
believe that abortion signifies harm to women as well as to
the unborn. For example, they feel that the possibility of
abortion increases, rather than decreases, the exploitation
of women by males and by others with power. Legal
abortion enables men to choose surgery for women rather
than responsibility for themselves.
I recall a young freshman woman who confided to me
last year that she tended to be politically pro-choice, but
that she had told her boyfriend that she was 100% pro-life.
Why? Because if he thought abortion were an option he
might not be sexually responsible in their relationship. If
she got pregnant, he would think, she could just have an
abortion, and he would be off the hook. And even if she
chose birth, she alone would be to blame for the baby
because she could have had an abortion. The existence of
the abortion "out" provides males and other oppressive
groups with a scapegoat, a way to trick women into blaming
themselves or their children for the unfair conditions
imposed in reality by ruling elites.
In this sort of critique, pro-lifers echo the voices of
some of today's most radical feminists, such as Catherine
MacKinnon-who has written in Feminism UnmodifU!d:
... [A] bortion facilitates women's heterosexual availability. In
other words, under conditions of gender inequality, sexual
liberation in this sense does not free women; it frees male sexual
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aggression. The availability of abortion removes the one
remaining legitimized reason that women have had for refusing
sex besides the headache. As Andrea Dworkin put it, analyzing
male ideology on abortion, "Getting laid was at stake." The
Playboy Foundation has supported abortion rights from day one;
it continues to, even with shrinking disposable funds, on a level of
priority comparable to that of its opposition to censorship.
There is a long line of such feminist thought, skeptical of
abortion, stretching back at least to the last century. Mattie
Brinkerhoff, a companion of Susan B. Anthony, wrote in
the journal The Revolution that
when a man steals to satisfY hunger, we may safely conclude that
there is something wrong in society--so when a woman destroys
the life of her unborn child, it is evidence that either by
education or circumstances she has been greatly wronged.
There is, then, no logic in concluding that qualms about
abortion imply a vindictive attitude toward women. Prolifers have been deeply misunderstood on this point

Misunderstanding Pro-Choice
Have pro-choicers also been misunderstood? In their
own minds, they have seen themselves simp]y as
spokespersons for freedom and against Jaws punishing
abortion. But pro-life people have sensed another spirit a
callousness toward the least of our sisters and brothers, a
desire to abandon the weak to the whim and will of the
strong. Pro-choicers think they are proclaiming the equal
dignity of women, but pro-lifers think they hear a denial of
the equal dignity of all human beings. Once again, the
culprit may be the same assumption discussed above, but
here reversed. Pro-lifers assume that opposition to the
criminalization of abortion is just a facade for a hardhearted lack of concern for babies and other helpless
people.
Is this always a fair inference? I think not Pro-choice
feminist theologian Beverly Wilding Harrison has asserted
that "No morally serious person disputes the principle that
human life should be respected. But this principle should
also [emphasis added] apply to women who face unwanted
pregnancy." In other words, some pro-choice people see
themselves as caring both for the mother and for her baby,
the same self-image as that of pro-lifers! Again, look
carefully at the survey data on abortion. A clear majority
seems to want abortion not to be a crime, at least in the
first trimester in cases of great hardship. But a solid
majority may also be willing to call abortion murder.
Indeed, a graphically worded 1986 New York Times poll
found that over 60% of women consider abortion "the
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same thing as murdering a child." If someone uses strong
terms like these, even if she is pro-choice with regard to the
law, she cannot fairly be accused of indifference to violence
against unborn children. And there are surely many other
pro-choicers who do not equate abortion with murder and
yet worry about the loss of humanitarian sensibility which
abortion may bring. It is better to err on the side of too
much non-violence, rather than of too much violence, in
building a better world. So Ronald Dworkin is concerned
that casual abortion may usher in "a more callous and
insensitive community" and perhaps "a more dangerous
one as well."
All such pro-choice people seem genuinely interested
in the well-being of unborn babies and seem to wish to
protect them if such protection could be provided without
punishing women who abort They are "pro-choice," but
they are "personally opposed" to abortion. They want
women free to choose, but they would prefer a choice
other than abortion. But pro-life people would also be
satisfied with choice if the choice were for life. There ought
to be reason to hope, therefore, that both sides could come
together and collaborate on the prevention of abortion by
encouraging the choice of life rather than by punishing the
choice of abortion. And, sharing a common end, they
ought not to be deeply divided by debate merely about the
most efficient ways to reach that joint goal.
West German Dialogue On Abortion

There exists, in fact, an important historical case of
just such a balanced debate about non-criminal protection
for the unborn. In the early 1970s, the West German
Parliament enacted a law depenalizing abortion in the first
trimester, provided that the woman first underwent
counseling in support of the choice of birth. The law was
held to be unconstitutional, by the majority of the Federal
Constitutional Court, as violative of the constitutional
premise of an "inherent" dignity and right to life for all
human beings. The West German high court reasoned that
as long as we protect newborn infants, whose human
development is significantly incomplete, consistency
requires protection prior to birth-for the only difference
birth makes is one of location, not of nature nor of value.
Indeed, consistency requires a theory of protection which
either values the organic continuum of biological human
life or else values the still undeveloped potentiality for
higher "phenomena specific to the human personality"-for
these are the only non-religious sources of inherent value
which the infant possesses at birth. In other words, the
German court maintained that if we think newborns
inherently worthy of protection, the only normative
theories available to us also require the protection of life
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even in the early weeks of pregnancy. The reverse
argument must also hold: If we refuse to recognize the
value of early prenatal life, we cannot consistently affirm
the inherent dignity even of postnatal life. The Court
concluded that to fail to affirm inherent human dignity in
the first trimester of pregnancy is to start again down the
road once traveled by Nazism.
Most interesting for our purposes, however, is the
pro-choice minority's dissenting opinion, which began:
The life of each individual human being is self-evidently a central
value of the legal order. It is uncontested [emphasis added] that
the constitutional duty to protect this life also includes its
preliminary stages before birth. The debates in Parliament and
before the Federal Constitutional Court dealt not with the
whether but rather only the how of this protection.
The dissenting justices agreed that abortion takes a human
life and that in a caring society (what Europeans call a
"social state") the government has a duty to protect all
vulnerable human beings, including both women and
unborn children. But, they reasoned, might not noncriminal means be actually more effective than
criminalization in limiting abortion? After all, if abortion is
illegal a pregnant woman will keep any plan to abort secret,
so there is no way the community can come to the
assistance of her and her baby. But if abortion is fully legal
after pro-life counseling and the offer of government help,
then she is more likely to be persuaded to let her child live.
The majority did not disagree in principle with the idea
that non-criminal protection should be preferred to
criminal. But, the justices held, finally to permit abortion
in non-hardship cases would teach a lack of respect for life.
Counseling requirements would come to seem a mere
formality, and few lives would be saved.
Protecting the Unborn Without Punishing Women

Perhaps the German majority had a point But what
if, in addition to supportive pro-life counseling, the
community were to use other ways to teach respect for life?
Might not the criminal law eventually come to be
superfluous? I would hope so.
Pro-choice people have argued that making abortion
legal is not the same as saying it ought to occur-anymore
than the fact that pregnant women have a legal right to
smoke and to drink means they should engage in such
behavior. Many pro choice people support advertising and
school campaigns against smoking and drinking during
pregnancy, even though they may not support punishing
women who harm their babies in these ways. Similarly,
those who support the legalization of drugs would surely
7

not wish to call a halt to anti-drug high school health
programs.
Right now it seems difficult to imagine that most prochoicers would agree to similar ads and legally-required
school programs aimed at showing the inhumanity of
abortion. Pro-choice reluctance could be due to a fear that
such education would be only a first step to criminalizing
abortion. But, on the other hand, the very success of these
efforts would help create a consensus against unnecessary
criminalization. Pro choicers as well as pro-lifers seem to
me to have a stake in ensuring the efficacy of non-criminal
methods of protecting unborn children.
What ought to be part of community teaching in
support of respect for life? Above all, in my opinion,
abortion should not be treated as an isolated issue but as
part and parcel of a public philosophy of concern and
support for all those in distress, including both mother and
child. State and private help for those caught in untimely
pregnancies must be fully publicized and the societal
attitude behind such help encouraged. Men must learn
their paternal legal responsibilities. Women must have real
choices other than abortion and be fully informed about
them.
In particular, the adoption alternative must be
encouraged and facilitated. Well over half the women who
have abortions say that they are doing so in order to avoid
the burdens of raising a child, not in order to avoid the
burdens of being pregnant. But the former burdens can be
entirely eliminated by adoption; there are people ready to
adopt any child, no matter what its race or disability might
be, as long as it is put up for adoption while still an
infant-according to the head of the National Committee
for Adoption. We need to work together to present
accurate and complete information regarding adoption
and to present those who choose to give up their offspring,
even if they are married, as acting out of deep and selfsacrificing love for their children. We must overcome the
possessive individualism which sees children as things to be
owned or disposed of, rather than as persons whose welfare
is an end in itself.
Also very important would be accurate and complete
education, in high schools and elsewhere, about the
development of prenatal life. In a perfect world, the
National Right to Life Committee's "Abortion stops a
beating heart" slogan ought to be welcomed without
controversy in any biology, health, civics, or sex education
program, along with a description of the myriad other
characteristics (brain waves, hand movements, facial
features, etc.) that can humanize an otherwise unknown
stranger and lead to a free choice for life.
Contraceptive education could also be an adjunct to
such community teaching efforts, but by itself it would not
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be sufficient. The many pro-choicers who emphasize only
contraception as a way to prevent abortion are surely
sincere and well-intentioned. But they are a bit like
someone who wishes to end discrimination against
Hispanics by limiting immigration from Latin America.
There will always be some women who have unwanted
pregnancies. For them, education in contraception is too
late, and so they need to be presented with other
alternatives to abortion.
Even though there would be no statutes punishing
women for aborting, in the ideal world we are sketching,
this does not mean that the law would have no role to play.
Our public education program would be a lie if there were
no public will backing it up with financial and other
supports. For example, there ought to be civil rights
protection for pregnant women and mothers against all
forms of discrimination. Both sexes should be entitled to
parenting leaves, or part-time jobs, without loss of fair
treatment in salary or status. Day care is an obvious
necessity which ought to be required by law. Other
measures which should command both pro-life and prochoice support could include birth insurance, to make less
frightening the risk of giving birth to a child with
disabilities, and public funding for adoptive parents who
are willing to accept older hard-to-place children.
Seventeen states already punish the killing of an unborn
child as homicide if it is done by some third party without
the mother's consent. Such laws are an excellent way to
teach the seriousness of a maternal choice for abortion
without in any way criminalizing that choice. Laws
requiring cremation, burial or "dignified" disposition of
the remains of aborted or miscarried fetuses are another
way to teach respect for life without making abortion a
crime.
Pro-life counseling (in factual, supportive, and
sensitive terminology) ought to be part of a coherent
alternative to criminalization, as was proposed in Germany.
Previously learned information about public help and
paternal responsibilities could be reviewed. But in addition
modern medicine now makes possible mother-child
bonding at a very early gestational age - by means of
sensitive stethoscopes that let the pregnant woman listen to
her unborn child's heartbeat and by means of ultrasound
devices that let her see her baby moving gently about in
her womb. Just as few women freely choose abortion once
they have felt their children kicking and turning within
them, surely few women would choose it if technology
showed them their children alive at far earlier stages. All
such information is necessary to any humanly informed
consent to an abortion, and so it ought somehow to be
provided.
France and Italy can teach us something else. There is
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a difference between the abortions that the law forbids and
those that it punishes. Both these nations in effect set out
in law the criteria for a justified (or excused) abortion, but
then leave it up to the woman alone to determine whether
her case falls within the statutory definition. Such statutes
no doubt seem ludicrous to someone who cares only about
the retributive or deterrent functions of law. But someone
who knows of law's very important teaching effects will see
their value. Perhaps our states, too, should consider anti
abortion legislation which seeks only to influence, rather
than to punish, a woman's choice.
One last point: The final demise of Roe v. Wade
would in itself contribute immeasurably to a non-criminal
strategy of protection from abortion. The U.S. Supreme
Court was able to mandate a national abortion law only by
labeling abortion a fundamental constitutional right. But it
is very hard to argue that there can be anything wrong with
exercising a fundamental right. How effective could high
school anti smoking or anti-drug programs be if the Court
were to announce a fundamental right to cigarettes or to
cocaine? By contrast, no European nation uses the idea of a
constitutional right in conjunction with elective abortion.
Abortion there is sometimes not punished, but it is not
made into an affirmative good. Merely not punishing
abortion leaves open possibilities of fetal protection in ways
that rights-talk does not.
This essay is clearly written in an optimistic vein. The
position I have here supported is tenable only if it is
empirically the case that non-criminal methods could be at
least as effective as criminalization in preventing abortion.
There may be many pro-life people who will insist upon
some abortion penalties (at least for the physician), not
because they are anti-women but because they doubt the
effectiveness of other means of protection for the unborn.
There may also be many pro-choicers who would resist fullscale non-criminal efforts to encourage and support
women in giving birth, fearing that if such efforts were
ineffective criminalization might be turned to after all. But
it seems to me that if we could come up with genuinely
effective non-penal ways to promote respect for life, most
of us could be happy with the results. Let us then search
together for these ways, knowing that our differences are
largely about means rather than about ends, that we share
the common goal of promoting human dignity both for
women and for the little lives within them. 0
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IS CARTESIAN DUALISM VALID?

Richard G. Nilges

After retirement from neurosurgery, I enrolled in
graduate studies of history at Valparaiso University. At 72, I
am, I suppose, history. But as philosopher and historian
Wilhelm Dilthey remarks: "The totality of human nature is
only to be found in history." I wanted this "totality." I
wanted answers to the "why" questions that arose as I
operated on the great conundrum, the organ capable of
comprehending the secrets of the universe, that mysterium,
that subtle coming together of soul and body, that
coincidence of opposites, the human brain. I had spent
most of my professional lifetime "bending over battered
brains" trying to save the almost hopelessly brain injured.
I would now "bend over the books" trying to find answers
to riddles. Why this random violence to the innocent as the
entirely preventable result of a careless foot on the
accelerator? Why the utter devastation of brain and mind
by a ten cent bullet? Why, indeed, do these misfortunes
happen in any predetermined or undetermined cosmic
Scheme of Things? Day after day, week after week, I had
the Sisyphean task of trying to fix the almost unfixable,
restore the minds of those rendered almost mindless by the
hazards of cruel fortune.
Further than all of this, I might find in some arcane
discipline, in an ancient Pseudo-Dionysius, even in
Neoplatonism perhaps, an oracular answer to that Holy
Grail of Science, to the question which has fascinated me
ever since I first studied the nervous system half a century
ago: What is the subtle and perplexing relation between
mind and brain? A foolish quest, you say! Is not the answer
in neurophysiology, in the computer metaphor of the
brain? Perhaps, I reply, perhaps not. The answer, though
veiled in obscurity, may only come by considering the
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"totality" of human nature and experience. If I could not
find answers, I would at least know how to ask the right
questions.
In History-English 606, during my "close reading" of
Rene Descartes' Discourse and Meditations, I had the almost
eerie realization that I was gazing into a clouded glass at
answers to my once unspoken questions, at a possible
solution to the ultimate mystery of soul and mind and
brain, that I might be "standing on the shoulders of a
giant" closer somehow to Martin Buber's Mysterium
Tremendum.
Descartes is now considered passe, his metaphysics
invalid, his dualism a dangerous psychosomatic split where
there should be unity. But is there unity of mind and body?
Or should there be? Is the apparent unity an illusion? Or is
the soul independent of the body a myth?
Cartesian dualism has confused many philosophers
for at least three centuries. simpler minds prefer monism,
or what Webster calls the "metaphysical view that there is
only one kind of substance or ultimate reality." This can be
either strict idealism where nothing exists except the
thought Or the thinker, or materialism where all is
material or has a material substructure, thought being
based on brain function.
It is conceptually easier to attribute all observable
nature to one reality. It is much harder to split the mind,
so to speak, and dualistically assign everything to one of
two different "mutually irreducible elements or classes of
elements' (Webster). The three great innovators in
philosophy took the hard choice and were dualists. Plato
taught that only the intelligible world, the world of ideas
(forms), has "true being" and is independent of the
material world; but yet this latter world, "perceived by the
senses," has "some being." Descartes divided reality into a
thinking substance, mind, and an extended substance,
matter. The mind has no capacities depending on the
material body. Kant held that there is a world "known by
The Cresset

consciousness of moral duty which is reality itself," and a
world of mere phenomena. (I am indebted to Simone
Petrement for these insights, principally in "Dualism in
Philosophy and Religion," Dictionary of the History of Ideas,
1973.)
As a rule, great teachers of philosophy are dualists,
their pupils monists. The wish to reconcile led Aristotle
into criticizing Plato, his teacher, for separating the idea
(the form) from the sensible thing. He placed emphasis on
matter as the potential for form; this material emphasis in
philosophy manifested itself again in Scholasticism's
Aristotelian revival and persisted up to the time of
Descartes whose dualism revitalized philosophy, at the cost
of making it less understandable. Descartes' metaphysics
started with the thought of his subjective self; Scholasticism
started with physical objects and progressed upward
through an understandable hierarchy, a "Chain of Being"
including man somewhere near its middle, to the
theological with God at the top. But Petrement concludes
that "dualism is not a fault but is philosophy's most
vigorous trait, leading to sound thinking." If not always
sound, dualistic thinking at least attempts to be more
comprehensive and does not try to force all ontology, all
being and reality, into one category as materialistic monism
attempts to do. Part of reality could be immaterial.
From my own field, medicine, let me draw a rough
parallel example. The materia medica, the drugs we use to
treat our patients, may be far less important than what I
like to call immateria medica, the way we interact with
patients, which may determine whether a patient will take
the prescribed medicine according to our directions or,
indeed, take it at all. The physician's personality, on
whatever level of material or immaterial reality
"personality" might be, is often the determining factor in
the cure of the patient.
Physicists are willing to accept the duality of "the
tricky notion of how electrons can be both particles and
waves," as john Van wrote in a recent Chicago Tribum book
review. Why cannot we accept the duality of soul and body,
mind and brain? Difficulties abound in such conceptual
dualism; but the consequences of the wrong choice, a
strong shift toward the materialistic explanation of all that
is human, could have far graver consequences than
whichever way we regard electrons.
I will now make a strong statement of my thesis:
despite the advance of mankind by materialism and
materialistic thinking, the private, secret self should be
inviolable. Does the progress of neuroscience mean the
death of philosophy? Are we "nothing but" puppets of our
neuronal synapses? Should the self be sacrificed on the
altar of Science? I will adduce two arguments, a strong
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subjective argument and a weak consequentialist one, in
favor of the reality of the self, the soul, the mind, and their
distinction from the material body.
Dr. George Crile, founder of the Cleveland Clinic,
could shock women of my grandmother's day by claiming
that he "had operated in all the areas of the body and
never found a soul." I could upstage this silly statement by
saying that I have operated "in all areas of the brain and
never saw a soul. But I was not looking for the soul of my
patient; I was operating on a physical structure, a brain; my
whole being was concentrated on materially changing this
materially diseased material structure for the better. There
was nothing immaterial involved here. Once my patient
awoke, I was again faced with him or her as a complete
person, as a self, a soul, a mind, and not just a brain.
Moderns would split the apparently less mysterious
mind from the more mysterious soul. Dinesh D'Souza, in a
1991 Atlantic article concerning the new "politically
correct" policies in academia, asks, "Will they enrich or
debase the minds and souls of the students?" Descartes uses
self, mind, and soul interchangeably. He asks, "What am
I?" His answer, "A thing that thinks." His self, his soul, the
part of him distinct from his body whose nature is only to
think," is also his mind. I will use mind to encompass all
three terms.
Besides being a "thinking thing," what is mind? Logan
Pearsall Smith presents his mind as a simile in "The
Spider":
No, what it (my mind) is really most like is a spider's web,
insecurely hung on leaves and twigs, quivering in every wind, and
sprinkled with dewdrops and dead flies . And at its centre,
pondering forever the Problem of Existence, sits motionless the
spider like and uncanny Soul.
In a 1990 article on brain death, I wrote of mind as
metaphor:
Yet what is the brain compared to its epiphany, the mind? And
the mind? The shimmer of whispering moonlight on darkly
rippling water, a single cloud on the horizon of a summer day,
autumn's demented wind loosening the last of the bronzed
leaves-all these are the mind. Without the mind, would they be
there? As spectral emanations of the Jaws of motion and physics,
of color, perhaps they would; perhaps noL
But similes and metaphors do not really explain the
mind, only what the mind may be like, or the physical
world as the mind appreciates and romanticizes it. Again,
what is mind? Webster defines mind: "That which reasons,
does intellectual work," or, ''The sum total of the conscious
states of the individual." A better definition is from Stanley
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Keeling: Mind is "a continuum of determinate actions and
states occurrent from moment to moment and so forming
the self's history." But Descartes' definition is best: The
mind is "a thinking thing-not extended in length,
breadth or depth-receiving nothing else from a body
except the idea of this or that body."
Does the structure of our minds as expressed in the
coinage of language impose any order on the universe?
The answer must be yes, but we have to be careful in our
usage of language and terms. In the following paragraph, I
try to express in language Descartes' universe, what
Marthinus Versfeld has called the "Cartesian Circle." This is
based on the Discourse and Meditations and refined by the
comments of other authors (Stuart Hampshire, Stanley
Keeling, Norman Malcolm, Julian Marias, Tom Sorell, and
Marthinus Versfeld).
By a process of doubting, I can doubt away
everything except my thinking self, my mind, which I know
exists because there has to be a doubter to doubt and a
thinker to think. "I think, therefore I am." I have an
"innate" idea of perfection, not from experience, but
because I received this idea while in my mother's womb.
Only God is perfect, perfection includes existence,
therefore God exists. God, being perfect, cannot be a
deceiver and endow me with any incorrect clear and
distinct ideas. I already have a clear idea of myself; I exist as
pure unextended res cogilans (a thinking thing). I have a
clear idea of my body as res exlensa (an extended thing),
utterly distinct from my unextended self, because I can
think of various parts of my body: two arms, two legs, a
trunk, head, eyes, etc. My mind is unextended and
indivisible; my body extended and divisible. The essence of
all bodies is extension; other bodies besides my own exist,
because I can think of various parts of them just like I can
think of the various parts of my own body. There are also
other minds, other selves, because I know my own reactions
when I am in pain. When I see or hear these reactions
from others: when I see facial grimacing or tears, when I
hear expressions of agony or howls of pain, I know that
others exist and are in pain even though I do not feel their
pain.
This is circular reasoning, but such reasoning can be
valid. According to Aristotle, circular reasoning, far from
being vicious, can be a demonstrative argument. The
Cartesian Circle can exist because "any clear and distinct
idea can be used to guarantee any other" (Versfeld). But all
parts of the circle should be equally valid; each depends on
the others; there cannot be any weak link in Descartes'
tight reasoning. To moderns, however, the weak link could
be Descartes' invocation of the "deus ex machina," God, to
hold the circle together. He might have done this to avoid
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the Holy Inquisition (Sorell). The idea of perfection
imposing order in Descartes' universe would be a weak
substitute for God. Nonetheless, the perfection of perfectly
clear and distinct ideas could logically hold the circle
together: I think and exist; I am pure mind, unextended;
my extended body and other extended bodies exist; other
minds exist by the pain test.
If we bury Descartes' mind-body dualism, if we insist
that the brain is more than the temple of the soul, what
have we left? Epiphenomenalism with mental events merely
a secondary quality of brain activity (as color is to the wave
form of light) , behaviorism denying mental process
completely and reducing humans to the level of rats in a
psychologist's cage, these monistic systems only confuse
more than they explain. In modern, monolithic,
materialistic, medical monism, a combination of the two
bankrupt theories, there is no God, no self, and really no
mind (although the last term may be invoked). All is
physical. "Thinking" takes place by reason of brain
processes. The following is from "Principles of Neurology"
by Adams and Victor:
It is this continuous inner consciousness of vast experiences and
ongoing cognitive activities that is called mind. Any separation of
the mental from the observable behavioral aspects of nervous
functioning is illusory. ...The physician is persuaded (of this)
truth by his daily clinical experience, in which every known
aberration of behavior and intellect appears as an expression of
cerebral disease.

Such an approach may be necessary in the practice of
clinical neurology, but it does not explain the mind-brain
enigma.
In the New York Review of Books (Nov. 22, 1990), Oliver
Sacks, a neurologist, revives dualism to an extent, but only
in a very oblique way and as an aid in fully understanding
the complexities of his patients. To protect himself and his
diluted dualism from his more materialistic colleagues, he
quotes Spinoza approvingly to the effect that the more we
know about the body, the less need there is for "any extra,
incorporeal essence or principle." But there is more
involved here than the strictly physical. No amount of
further knowledge will allow us to make the conceptual
jump from the neural synapse to the individual. As
Malcolm so wisely points out, brains do not see, hear, or
think; people do.
But today even psychiatry, the science of the mind, is
less and less concerned with the mind per se, as more and
more the psychiatrist uses psychotropic drugs to treat
molecular chemical disturbances of neural transmission. A
prime example of this is the lithium treatment of manic
The Cresset

psychosis, a disease which used to be considered a strictly
"mental" disorder. But is such monism philosophically
valid just because it is pragmatically useful ?
To this I reply with a strong "No," based on
Descartes' guidance of my introspection. Just as Job could
cry, "I know that my Redeemer liveth," I know that I, and
not just my neurons, exist. Each step in the process of my
knowing depends on the preceding; but the whole, which
is always greater than any of its parts, is logically valid.
When the thinker thinks of himself or herself, Descartes
and Versfeld state that a transparency is overlaid on the
sensation from the world. Versfeld calls this transparency
"the veil of self." It is this transparency, this consciousness
of myself thinking about myself, that science cannot
explain away. When I read "The Deluge" (a novel by
Sienkiewicz about the Swedish invasion of Poland in the
seventeenth century), I am no longer in my study; I do not
feel the pressure of the chair against my buttocks; I am not
even aware of the black squiggles on the white page in
front of me: I ride with the Polish cavalry across the endless
Polish plain; I feel only my horse beneath me, and I hear
the rattle of the weapons of my comrades. From time to
time, I come back to myself, and with my "mind's eye" I see
myself on horseback. (I have never ridden a horse.) It is
this transport out of myself, and myself contemplating my
transcendence into a different time and place, which
convinces me that I exist in my mind alone, and entirely
separately from my body.
But the logical question remains: How does my
entirely unextended mind influence my extended body if
there is strict mind body dualism? Descartes is none too
clear on this point. His argument is characteristically
circular; the following is taken from Versfeld. Experience
teaches us that the mind can influence the body; the mind
cannot know the nature of its union with the body; the
mind cannot disown its body ; but we know from
experience that the incorporeal mind can move the very
corporeal body-this is what experience teaches. Plotinus,
the founder of Neoplatonism, says it better: "The soul is all
in all and all in every part." My mind is "all in all" with my
body, yet distinct from it; I am a composite, yet I am my
mind. My mind appreciates every sensation, not as a pilot
of a ship appreciates damage to his vessel by sight or sound,
but as distinct ideas of happenings to myself as clear
warnings to avoid pain (to remove my foot from a nail), or
as savory suggestions to pursue the pleasures of good food.
The clearness and distinctness of these sensations show
that they are valid. Descartes then calls on our will, which is
as free as God's, to act on our ideas of sensory events and
avoid the harm or pursue the good. Acting in this way has
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survival or utilitarian value.
Now, with fortune-tellers and necromancers, I try to
forsee the future, the further slide down the ethical
"slippery slope" caused by the elimination of the
unscientific concept of mind, soul, and self from our lives.
Are all things scien.tifically explainable? Can we have no
mysteries? My vision is not in a cloudy crystal ball but is
based on what I have observed in the progress and
deterioration of the medical profession in the 49 years I
studied and practiced it. In the 1940s, we could prescribe
morphine for pain, barbiturates for insomnia; we could
treat bacterial infections effectively with penicillin or
sulfanilamide; and surgeons could operate in many areas of
the body. Effective treatment for viral disease, cancers, and
psychoses were unknown. But we were "with" the patient's
self or soul. We went down into a "valley of death" with the
patient who was dying despite (or because of) our care. A
copy of Sir Luke Fildes' painting of "The Doctor" used to
hang in almost every doctor's waiting room. This painting
was a true picture of the times: the doctor sits beside his
dying patient, a little girl, doing nothing because he can do
no more than give comfort to the frightened parents, the
mother crying, the father with his hand on her shoulder.
That old-fashioned doctor was truly with his patient
and her parents. Where are we now? We are lost in our very
effective technology, mechanically fixing only body parts of
the extended patient (in the sense of Cartesian extension),
disregarding the patient as a whole, despite our lip service
to "wholistic" medicine. And this is true in all fields. As our
technology improves, we regard men and women more and
more as "thinking machines," "processing" information
very inefficiently compared to our ideal brain, the supercomputer.
To prevent slipping into a total disregard for humans
as humans, going far "beyond freedom and dignity,"
forgetting completely Koestler's "ghost in the machine," we
must retain dualism and "Render therefore to Caesar ... "
Render therefore to the imperious Caesar of materialism the
things (res exlensa) that are material, and to God the things (res
cogitans) that are immaterial. 0
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Strange how they visit me at 3 a.m.,
some accusing, some grateful, some bothfaces tight with pain, flushed and heavy, or
in different, anesthetized.
They take shape
like patches of fog in my headlights while I
thread these dark streets home.
They come
Beseeching, pleading with me, though I can
no longer help them, or they rise
transcendent with resignation as if they knew
something I don't (I, a hand hired
to work in the fields about to be foreclosed.)
Like that woman (I forget her name) whose heart
stopped under the knife a long minute.
Later,
she said she'd died and seen a peculiar light.
I don't recall the rest, only her face
when she tried to say just what it was she sawthat and the way her hand flitted
birdlike over the sheet.
I wonder,
do our brain cells at the edge
burst with a final energy? Can a last
illusion be more real than life?
I don't knowhallucination can't explain it-explains
nothing, really.
The divisible flesh both is
and isn't us. That much I feel, and more:
we are the whole left when the parts are gone.
Something surrounds us
we have to lose everything else to find.
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THE SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY THEORY OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT:
A PRELIMINARY DISCUSSION OF AN EMERGING CONCEPT
Joe Patrick Bean
Many Americans want this nation to be made a much
safer place than it now seems to be. We expect government
to minimize our risk of physical danger. We demand to be
protected from violent crime, illegal drugs, tainted foods,
drunk drivers, unsafe appliances, cancer-causing
pollutants, accident-prone automobiles and AIDS-infected
doctors. And that's only the beginning of our list.
Increasingly, activists from a variety of organizations and
causes spanning the ideological spectrum are demanding
that government also minimize the risk of non-physical
danger. They contend that the power of the state can
legitimately be used to protect us-particularly specific
groups such as women and children-from mental,
emotional, moral and psychological harm.
These safety seekers frequently identifY the mass media
as major instrumental causes of a wide array of nonphysical harms. To limit such dangers, they want to change
rather significantly the way we interpret the First
Amendment, reversing the broad conceptualization of
protected expression shaped by the Supreme Court since
the late 1950s.
In its place, they offer what may be termed the "social
responsibility theory of the First Amendment." The
intellectual basis for this theory may be found in arguments
outlined in A Free and Responsible Press, the 1947 report of
the Commission on Freedom of the Press (often called the
Hutchins Commission because it was chaired by University
of Chicago Chancellor Robert Maynard Hutchins).
The few who are able to use the machinery of the press as
an instrument of mass communication have not provided a
service adequate to the needs of the society," the commission
noted. Further, "those who direct the machinery of the press have

Joe Patrick Bean teaches at Concordia Lutheran College in
Austin, Texas, where he is an Assistant Professor of History and
Journalism. He is also a contributing columnist for the San
Antonio Express-News. He wishes to acknowledge the help of
ProfessorJ Michael Quinn and Dr. Gene Burd of the University of
Texas at Austin in reviewing an earlier version of this essay.
16

engaged from time to time in practices that the society condemns
and which, if continued, it will inevitably undertake to regulate or
control ....
"The press must know that its faults and errors have ceased to
be private vagaries and have become public dangers . . . . The
legal right [freedom of the press] will stand if the moral right is
realized or tolerably approximated. There is a point beyond
which failure to realize the moral right will entail encroachment
by the state upon the existing legal right.
If the press continues to act irreponsibly, particularly
in regard to politics and public opinion, the commission
warned, society might justifiably demand that government
intervene. But such regulation, which would infringe on
traditional First Amendment protections, could be avoided
if the press would act in a more socially responsible
manner.
Activists borrowing the social responsibility theory from
the Hutchins Commission move far beyond its original
scope. While the commission focused primarily on
newspapers, today's safety seekers apply the concept to all
mass media. They also seem to be less interested in political
communication than the Hutchins Commission but more
concerned with social and cultural forms of expression.
And they are working to impose the social responsibility
theory not on particular channels of communication but
much more fundamentally on how the First Amendment
itself is interpreted.
One of the chief areas in which today's social
responsibility activists seek to reinterpret the First
Amendment is in defining pornography and obscenity.
Beginning with Roth v. United States (1957), the Supreme
Court gradually liberalized the standards for granting
constitutional protection to sexually explicit material that
traditionally had been regarded as obscene.
In Memoirs v. Massachusetts ( 1966), the Supreme Court
outlined a three-part test for obscenity. To justifY legal
suppression, sexually explicit material must meet all three
parts of the test: "(a) the dominant theme taken as a whole
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appeals to a prurient interest in sex; (b) the material is
patently offensive because it affronts contemporary
community standards relating to the description or
representation of sexual matters; and (c) material is utterly
without redeeming social value."
The court further clarified this test in Miller v. California
(1973). To decide obscenity cases, courts must determine:
"(a) whether 'the average person applying contemporary
community standards' would find the work taken as a
whole appeals to the prurient interest; (b) whether the
work depicts or describes, in a patently offensive way,
sexual conduct specifically defined by the applicable state
law; and (c) whether the work taken as a whole lacks
serious literary, artistic, political or scientific value."
Some feminist legal scholars, however, reject these
defmitions of obscenity, arguing that they are based on a
male-centered interpretation of the First Amendment that
is socially irresponsible because it ignores pornography's
impact on women. (Not all feminists agree; this issue has
badly divided the feminist movement.) They maintain that
obscene materials should be banned not on the basis of
sexual content or prurience, but because they inherently
objectifY, subordinate and degrade women.
"ln the United States the obscenity laws are all about not
liking to see naked bodies, or homosexual activity, in
public," Catharine MacKinnon, a leading feminist legal
scholar and law professor at the University of Michigan,
told The New York Times earlier this year. "Our laws don't
consider the harm to women."
In 1983, MacKinnon incorporated feminist social
responsibility theory in a Minneapolis anti-obscenity
ordinance she helped draft. The measure banned
pornography, which it defined as the "graphic sexually
explicit subordination" of women. The Minneapolis City
Council adopted the proposed ordinance but could not
override a mayoral veto. MacKinnon wrote a similar
ordinance for Indianapolis that became law there in 1985,
but the 7th U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals subsequently
declared it unconstitutional.
While agreeing to overturn the Indianapolis ordinance
in practice, Judge Frank Easterbrook also in principle
implicitly endorsed the feminist version of social
responsibility theory. "Depictions of subordination tend to
perpetuate subordination," he wrote. "The subordinate
status of women in turn leads to affront and lower pay at
work, insult and injury at home, battery and rape on the
streets. In the language of the legislature, 'pornography is
central in creating and maintaining sex as a basis of
discrimination.'"
This feminist interpretation of the First Amendment has
yet to survive a court challenge in the United States, but
MacKinnon scored a victory in a precedent-setting
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Canadian case earlier this year. Accepting the arguments
made in a brief she had helped write, the Supreme Court
of Canada voted unanimously to uphold the nation's
obscenity statute.
The Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, similar
to the U.S. Bill of Rights, protects both free expression and
equal rights for women. In deciding the case of Butlerv. Her
Majesty the Queen (Feb. 27, 1992}, the court held that the
equal-rights provision must take precedence over freedom
of expression when pornography is the issue.
"If true equality between male and female persons is to
be achieved we cannot ignore the threat to equality
resulting from exposure to audiences of certain types of
violent and degrading material," the court held. "Materials
portraying women as a class of objects for sexual
exploitation and abuse have a negative social impact on the
individual's sense of self-worth and acceptance."
This success in Canada gives MacKinnon and other
feminist legal scholars hope that their version of social
reponsibility theory will soon prevail in the United States,
too. "There are going to be several pieces of legislation in
Congress soon," she told The New York Times, "predicated
on the harm approach and recognizing that both the
making of pornography and its use do harm to women."
Feminist social responsibility theory is also evident in
the sexual harassment complaints five female brewery
workers filed in November 1991 against Stroh Brewing Co.
Some of the complainants claim that the company
produces "sexist, degrading promotion posters and
advertisements" that harm female employees by implicitly
condoning or even encouraging sexual harassment in the
workplace.
In ads such as Old Milwaukee beer's infamous "Swedish
bikini team" spot, one of the complaints alleges, "the
conduct of Stroh's is so extreme and outrageous that it
passes the bounds of decency and is utterly intolerable in
the civilized community." The complainants sought
monetary damanges and demanded that Stroh cancel all
advertising that objectifies and degrades women.
Commercial speech has never enjoyed the full
constitutional protections accorded political expression in
this country. Yet, in Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v.
Public Service Commision of New York (1980), the Supreme
Court recognized that the First Amendment usually
protects advertising for legal products and services. It does
not, however, protect false, misleading and deceptive ads.
The Central Hudson decision also allows government to
ban or regulate advertising even for legal products and
services when doing so serves a legitimate or substantial
state interest.
Feminist social responsibility theory holds that
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government has, or should have, such an interest in
banning advertising that degrades women. The same
argument could also logically be used to justifY prohibiting
all socially irresponsible depictions of women, even ones
that are not sexually explicit or suggestive. It could
ultimately be extended far beyond advertising to apply to
all forms of communication, including those that have
historically enjoyed the broadest constitutional protections.
Opponents of violence in the mass media are also using
the social responisiblity theory of the First Amendment to
stem what they regard as a real harm to society, particularly
impressionable children. Federal and state courts have,
however, historically been reluctant to prohibit the media
from publishing or broadcasting violent material.
In Schenck v. United Stales (1919), the Supreme Court
said that expression is protected unless it presents a "clear
and present danger to bring about the substantive evils that
Congress has a right to prevent." Writing for the court,
Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr. explained that "the most
stringent protection of free speech would n.ot protect a
man in falsely shouting fire in a theater and causing a
panic."
In Brandenburg v. Ohio ( 1969), the Supreme Court
clarified what it had meant by clear and present danger,
ruling that expression can be prohibited or punished only
if it "is directed to inciting or producing imminent lawless
action and is likely to incite or produce such actions."
Here, as in Schenck, the court sought to prevent only
physical danger.
In a number of cases at the state level within the past
15 years, courts have refused to hold the media liable for
publishing or broadcasting violent acts that audience
members have later imitated, causing injury or even death
to themselves or others. Applying the Brandenburg
imminent-harm test, the courts have ruled that the media
usually cannot be held directly responsible for inciting
dangerous conduct.
Social scientists and communication researchers
working within the past two decades have determined that
violence can adversely affect viewers, particularly children.
Careful, sophisticated studies suggest that media violence
may provide negative role models that young viewers may
imitate, may reinforce latent tendencies toward violence,
may make viewers less sensitive to real violence, and may
cultivate a fear that the world is a more dangerous place
than it actually is. Yet few of these studies suggest that
media violence inevitably, directly causes real violence.
A widespread popular perception nonetheless holds the
media directly, even solely, responsible for causing violent
behavior and thus justifies calls for regulation or
prohibition of media violence. According to Houston City
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Councilman Judson Robinson III, for example, movies
such as Juice, New Jack City and Colors unnecesssarily glorify
crime and violence. Such movies thus send the wrong
messages to teen-agers, teaching them that violence is
socially. acceptable, even profitable, behavior. This seriously
distorts their values even if they do not engage in violence
themselves.
..
Earlier this year, Robinson proposed that the City
Council· establish a committee to preview movies. Only
those .that this board decided. "could be viewed in Houston
and not have a negative impact on our youth" would be
allowed to play in the city. ·"The problem we have today is
trem.~ndous,"- he told The Houston Post "And while I can
see the other side, maybe it's time we said enough is
enough."
Robinson acknowledged that his proposal amounts to
censorship but asserted that "perhaps in this case, the
lesser of two evils is better." He further suggested that
banning violent music and books might also be justified.
For Robinson and those who support his plan, the choice
seems very simple and clearcut: violence or censorship. If
the media do not voluntarily limit their presentations of
the former, the social responsibility theory of the First
Amendment justifies the latter.
A group of Fort Worth parents last year asked the City
Council there to adopt an ordinance that would fine movie
theaters and videotape distributors if they allowed minors
to view "unsuitable" films. After the city attorney warned
that the proposed ordinance was probably
unconstitutional, the council declined to adopt it
Many parents who had supported it, however,
demanded that the council nonetheless enact the
ordinance. According to one of the parents, the group 's
primary concern was violent movies. "We're paying th e
price for the desensitization to this violence," she told The
Associated Press. "We realize that there are a lot of factors
that cause a lot of young people to turn to crime. But there
is a link between violence and the viewing of violence and
how it affects children."
In February, the American Psychological Association
released a five-year study, titled "Big world, small screen,"
examining the social impact of television. It concluded,
according to a Reuters News Service summary, that "the
average child watches 8,000 murders and 100,000 other
acts of violence on television by the time he or she leaves
elementary school .... "
"Children are learning racial and sexual prejudices and
violent behavior from the programs they watch ... .
Violence on television influences viewers, especially
children and teen-agers, to use violence to resolve conflicts
and makes them more accepting of sexual violence and
rape."
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The APA report presents a social responsibility
interpretation of "public interest" and the legitimate use of
government regulatory power. It urges the Federal
Communications Commission to require, as a condition of
license renewal, that broadcasters serve the public interest
more directly by limiting the depiction of violence in their
programming. The television industry does not seem
willing to do this voluntarily.
Thus, government regulatory power can justifiably be
used to ban or control the broadcast of material that likely
does not fall outside of traditional constitutional
protections. The goal is to reduce the harmful
psychological and social effects of violent programming on
younger viewers who are apparently addicted to television
in overwhelming numbers.
The future of the social responsibility theory of the First
Amendment is still uncertain. We may surmise, however,
that federal courts not favorably inclined to expansive
protections of civil liberties might find in social
responsibility theory a convenient rationale for placing
further limits on the First Amendment. We can be far more
certain that this theory of First Amendment interpretation
will continue to be asserted if the mass media do not
voluntarily take steps to prevent or minimize the nonphysical harms that many organizations and causes believe·
they inflict.
The demand that the power of the state be used to do so
will grow apace with public perceptions of these dangers
and the growing body of disinterested research suggesting
that "irresponsible" forms of mass communication can,
indeed, exert negative effects on society, even if they are
often subtle, indirect and non-physical. The justification
for applying social responsibility theory to the First
Amendment: thus becomes increasingly attractive to many
safety seekers in the United States.
By itself, this would be troubling enough to traditional
civil libertarians. But the future of free expression becomes·
even cloudier when we consider that many Americans do
not regard the First Amendment and its protections very
highly when they are actually put into practice.
"As the bicentennial of the Bill of Rights neared, the
first wave of a nationwide survey found that Americans rate
free speech as their second most precious First
Amendment right and regard a free press highly-in the
abstract," Robert 0. Wyatt reported last year in
summarizing the results of a survey conducted for the
American Society of Newspaper Editors. "But, when
questioned about specifics, those surveyed during 1990
displayed an alarming willingness to remove legal
protection from forms of free expression they merely
disagreed with or found offensive."
The Hutchins Commission contended that
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"accountability, like subjection to law, is not necessarily a
net subtraction from liberty; the affirmative factor of
freedom, freedom for, may be enhanced." The ASNE
survey suggests that many Americans implicitly endorse this
principle.
Yet some crucial questions still remain essentially
unanswered: When does social responsibility theory reach
the point of diminishing returns? At what point does the
mitigation of non-physical harms it seeks to achieve, if it
can actually accomplish that goal, no longer outweigh the
very real damage it does to longstanding First Amendment
protections? The balancing of competing interests, so
fundamental to this nation's constitutional system, requires
that these questions be addressed -and soon.
The safety seekers among us would do well to recall
relevant words of caution from Benjamin Franklin: "Those
who would give up essential liberty, to purchase a little
temporary safety, deserve neither liberty nor safety." And,
we might note, often lose both in the end. But if this
ultimately happens, the mass media will be at least partly
culpable. If communicators and civil libertarians continue
to insist that the First Amendment shields even the most
blatantly non-physically harmful irresponsibility from
public accountability, they help make limiting its rights an
even more compelling option. 0
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"READ SOME GOOD STUFF FOR WILl''
J.T. Ledbetter

Nebraska was cool and the leaves were turning. It was
that breezy time of year when shadows were long across the
ground and you thought that just maybe everything you
had learned about truth and beauty were true.
After all, the request to talk to a prisoner at the
penitentiary in Lincoln wasn't so odd. Bill Roundey was
never one to beat around the bush. After all, Dolores and I
were in the mid-west, why not come by?
And why not? Our '69 VW van had not broken down
lately... though the look on the mechanic's face outside of
Grand Island was still fresh in my mind as he walked to the
front of the van looking for the motor ...
What should/could I say to an inmate? What was he
in for? How long? Questions rolled like the eastern
Nebraska hills until the grey fortress of the penitentiary
rose out of the milo fields and it was too late to wonder if
maybe he would like Frost ... Dylan Thomas ... Keats ... or
whether I should ask him what he thought about negative
capability or whether he preferred T.S. Eliot before or after
his conversion ..
A beefy guard squinted at me through the thick
protective glass and pushed a clipboard through the special
window with a visitor's badge attached.
"Wait here!"
I · waited ... and the antiseptic smell almost
overpowered me until I was let out, through many locked
doors, into the Quad area toward the ugly, squat building
beyond where, I was told, "Wili's doing hard time." I didn't
·ask, but'·the guard added "Life. Killed a woman ... have a

Jack Ledbetter, a familiar name for Cresset readers, teaches in
the English Department at California Lutheran University. His
list of poetry publications is long, and he has in addition published
numerous articles on reading literature and the pedagogy of
literature. In this essay, we encounter a new dimension, but not a
surprising one.
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good talk ... "
Keats, Shelley. Wordsworth ... all the names I knew and
loved disappeared as Wili watched me approach, not like
an animal behind the blue steel bars, like a
shadow ... quiet ... head erect, arms perfectly still...smoke
holding, ... not rising into the autumn air... steady, watching
me come on ...
"Something there is that doesn't love a wall ... " Frost's
words came and went in my mind. His cell door opened
and we were led to a nearby room with a table and two
chairs. The guard stood just outside. The room was heavy
with musk, sweat, old paint. Outside the pale autumn sun
slanted across the miles of com and milo, and the people
from Lincoln were hurrying down the interstate: tourists
hummed on I-80 to California to retirement or east to
education as Karl Shapiro said ... but Wili wasn't going
anywhere. Wili was waiting to die. He had been waiting a
long, long time ...watching the cars drill past the old barns
on their way to Seward or York or Grand Island where, at
night, the sand hill cranes stand in the shallow North Platte
River, small moons in their eyes ...
... and we talked about that..and about
Hemingway ... he liked Hemingway... Steinbeck... Frost... "You
like Frost?" he asked ... my ears pricked up ... "Yes ... " and we
lapsed into silence as each found some memory locked in a
Frost poem. We didn't bring it up, just savored the
image ... the line or the rhyme. "He's good, ain't he?" and
Wili laughed ... not a real laugh, really, a chuckle.. .like you
might hear from someone suddenly remembering
something fine. Frost could do that to you .. .if you knew
him .. and Wili did.
Wili showed me the books he read, paperbacks
stacked from floor to ceiling of his cell...manuscripts of
poems he had worked on for months ...years ...words falling
out onto the hard floor of that tiny room he could escape
only through reading and writing... or ...
"I should have been a pair of ragged claws scuttling
The Cresset

across the floors of the silent seas ... " Wili looked at me and
did not smile. "You dig Eliot?" "Yes. I do ...yes .. " and we
looked at each other without comment ... "I have measured
out my live in coffee spoons ... " I said, continuing the Eliot
lines ...
The guard looked in through the small glass square
in the door. Wili glanced at his watch. "You teach, man?
Where? What do you say to them dudes? Do you tell them
the straight skinny?" He laughed. "I tell them what I can,"
I replied. Wili was silent a moment, then, "One could do
worse than be a swinger of birches ... "
"I hear you, Wili. How about 'I celebrate myself and
sing myself...'" His faced brightened. He knew Whitman
all right. His eyes narrowed:
"And what I assume, you shall assume ... "
"I believe a leaf of grass is no less than the journeywork of the stars ... "
We both smiled at that. Wili reached out his large
hand and covered mine. The room was still as death, with
only one shadow falling across the table where we sat, outdoing each other with quotes ... Wili laughing as I hit my
head with my hand trying to recall his line .. .leafing
through one of his books to find the right line to complete

0 Bill Roundy worked for the Department of
Corrections in Nebraska. He is now a private
investigator and prisonor advocate.
0 Wili was convicted in 1977 of rape and murder
committed during a burglary.
0 On Wednesday August 5, 1992, the Supreme
Court upheld a stay of execution for Wili, who was
scheduled for execution on August 6. He remains
on death row.
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one I had started ...
"Try this Wili:
'There's a certain slant oflight,
Winter afternoons,
That oppresses, like the heft
Of cathedral tunes.'
"Emily Dickinson," he said. I nodded. He screwed
up his forehead and said:
'Success is counted sweetest
By those who ne're succeed.
To comprehend a nectar
Requires sorest need.'
"I got whatcha call your 'sorest need.' " He didn't
laugh at that, but looked out the one window at the sun
moving toward the line of elms by the river ... and as the
room grew dim we sat with our books before us, opened to
lines we loved ... poems we had grown up with or come to
later in life .. .images... pictures ... characters and events ... and
Wili fingered a paperback absentmindedly ... almost
lovingly, I thought. No, there was more realism in it than
that; my thoughts were lost in the gathering gloom and we
were silent for a long time ... then
"You going back to California?" It was not a question.
I waited. "Read some good stuff for Wili ... read P<?ems you
like ... read ... " His voice trailed off and he looked away ... his
voice chiseled bronze in the last ethereal light that suffused
the room. "...will you read mine?" And he handed me a
paperback of his poems printed at the prison ... and that was
that. The guard opened the heavy door and led him out,
down a dark hallway and through iron doors that would
not let me follow ... but I have followed him ... all this
time ... 0
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BLACKBIRD IN THE CHIMNEY

Robert Siegel
Good Friday
We hear his feet scrabble on the metal pipe,
trying for an impossible foothold. The wings beat
and beat, helpless in the chute
that narrows toward the top. What intricate, dark
way did he find down the liner pipe
looking for a place to nest? Some strange
instinct led him through the chimney flanges
past the metal bin where his kind bang
and chatter every spring-then launch out,
a swirling punctuation in the clouds
scribbled across March skies. Whatever it was,
he's trapped. Sometimes one or two
will fluster down the main pipe. At the bottom,
when the damper opens, the sooty pair
squawk and whirr into the light, true
to the old saw, The way up is down. These two
find hell has a convenient exit,
but his is sealed-the only way out is up.
I unscrew the metal chimney top and search
with the flashlight a crevice twenty feet deep.
The pipe curves: I cannot see the bottom.
Meanwhile his every feather's and claw's
slightest twitch is magnified by the pipes.
"He's here. He's right here. I can hear him"my daughter's voice comes up from the fireplace,
trembling at his proximity, delicate as his bones.
"It's only a bird," I say again. "It doesn't suffernot the way we would suffer. It can't think
that it has suffered-is suffering-will suffer. "
So ends my conjugation, muffled by the pipe.
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"Still-he suffers," she says, and for a moment
the bird is still. Then the earnest scrabbling
begins again. The only thing is to try
to get out, even if you can't get out,
I think, and lower the triple hook on fishing line
again and again. The doing something
helps her and helps me high on that windy roof,
one step from rotten gutters. Last, hoping the small
gleam in the light is not his eye, I seal
the chimney, make a mental note of the screen
that should prevent this happening again.
''Three days"-the Humane Society says-"A fourth,
and it is finished for sure."
My daughter is growing up. She understands,
doesn't want her father to take more risks.
Her silence matches mine now, holding, as it does,
the neighbor drowned in a river, the classmate dying
of leukemia, the jogger struck down quadraplegic.
Dad couldn't help this time, unlike the time
he drilled through the kitchen wall at I a.m.
behind the refrigerator, making an exit
for the shy and unwilling-to-be-rescued
hamster, who finally came out for cheese
and her maternal wheedling. Or the time
he released the gerbil from the cooled-off furnace
after listening for his scratching on the pipes.
That one died of old age in his sleep,
a seer, having communicated (if gerbils can)
a vision to his cagemate
of a dark cold place at the bottom, an inedible wall,
hunger, thirst, and fear-when the wall opened
and light came through and a warm human hand.
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Double Lives
Arvid F. Sponberg
"I know you're not here,
officially, I mean-"
This fall, several conversations
have .begun this way. I'm afraid I have
become
something
of
an
embarrassment, rather like the odd
pieces of furniture that doesn't fit with
the decor in any room in the house.
I am on research leave this fall
and will be on sabbatical next termbut I haven't gone anywhere. I work in
my office and I am around the
building all day, almost every day.
"Well," says on colleague, "I see
more of you when you're on leave
then I do when you're teaching .... "
I'm leading a double life: in the
university but not of it. This has
produced a certain conversational
awkwardness. I understand a little
better what writers of an earlier

Gus Sponberg teaches theatre and the
history of drama in the Department of
English at VU and contributes re[fUlarly to
Campus Diary for The Cresset. He is
writing on the American playwrght A. R.
Gurney. His book, Broadway Talks, was
published in 1990. He is not here.
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generation meant when they wrote
that a character was in a "false
position."
People dare not ask me about my
research. They have either heard all
about it already-yawn-or they have
been warned (by others, not by me)
not to ask unless they can spare an
hour or two. And of course they can't.
And they can't talk to me about the
other two great academic subjectsclasses and committees-because: "I
know you're not here, officially."
Yes, decidedly awkward. Why
didn't he just go away? Then we could
have used his office.
MY RESEARCH. (Please stifle your
yawn until the paragraph break.)
A.R. Gurney is an American
playwright. He was born in 1930 and
has been writing plays since 1955.
During most of his career he has
written for the nonprofit theatre (from
which, in the last decade, he has made
healthy profits; see The Dining Room,
The Cocktail Hour, Love Letters, etc.) But
in 1987, he took a leave from the
nonprofit theater and found
producers for a Broadway production
of his play Sweet Sue. Gurney essayed
the double life and so did his
characters.
There really are only two
characters in the play-Sue and Jake.
But Gurney divides them. Their alter
egos he names Sue Too and Jake Too.
Though there are only two characters,
there are four actors. On Broadway

Mary Tyler Moore played Sue and
Lynn Redgrave played Sue Too. (I
forget who played Jake and Jake Too
and I am not going to look it up.)
Gurney likes to do this-to tell a
story so that you see it from several
perspectives. He wrote a novel once
called The Gospel According to Joe. It's
Joseph's version of Jesus' ministry. It
was published in 1974 and asJoe uses
a 1970's kind of idiom to tell the Life
from the edge, so to speak, rather than
the Center, Gurney moves us back and
forth between first century Judea and
twentieth century America. (Gore
Vidal is trying to do the same thing
with his new novel about Jesus which
involves Peter, television, and time
travel.) I am writing about how Gurney
uses language, plot and setting to
achieve his double perspectives.
SUE and ANNA.
Sue is a greeting card illustrator
who wants to be a true artist. She falls
for Jake, a college friend of her son.
Jake falls for her, too, but not as hard.
Sue and Sue Too and Jake and Jake
Too are of two (four?) minds, you
might say, about their relationship.
However, they have in common a love
for Anna Karenina.
(Choosing this novel as a
touchstone for his characters betrays, I
fear,
Gurney's
professorial
background. In the 25 years that he
wasn't making money in the theater,
he taught humanities at MIT. He was
leading a double-double life:
The Cresset

playwright among the professors [or
was he a professor among the
playwrights?] and humanist among the
scientists and the engineers.)
Anna Karenina is about Anna and
her lover, Alexis Vronsky, who commit
adultery and suffer for it. It is also
about Kitty Shcherbatskaya and Kostya
Levin who marry and jog along pretty
well together. Anna and Alexis are
forced to live in the country because
they are not acceptable in town, where
Anna, but not Alexis, is in a false
position. Kitty and Kostya are often
forced to go to town, where Kostya
feels as if he is in a false position, and
prefers to live in the country. Alexis is
a jerk who breaks horse's backs and
Anna's heart. Kostya is a kind man
who tries to ease the burdens of the
Russian peasant. Kitty is a warm
woman who knows exactly how to calm
any crisis. Anna is a beautiful woman
tortured by society because she refuses
to be a hypocrite.
Did Gurney really expect his
1987 American audience to know all
this before Sue and Jake mentioned
the book? I believe he hoped they
would and I thank him for paying me
the compliment. But the truth is it
took me the last two weeks to read
Anna Karenina and find all this out.
Until I read the novel, I was in a false
position with respect to the play.
Having read the novel, I can spy into
Gurney's play with a little more
understanding.
WRITERS AND SPIES.
James Jesus Angleton, the
disgraced
chief
of
CIA
counterintelligence, was an English
major at Yale about the time that
Gurney was ten years old. He was
converted from poetry to espionage by
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his English professor, Norman Holmes
Pearson.
"Angleton, who kept reading
poetry all his life, claimed in later years
that he had always tried to recruit
agents from the Yale English
Departrnen t. He believed that those
trained in New Criticism, with its seven
types of ambiguity, were particularly
suited to the interpretation of
intelligence data.
"Consider, after all, the ways a
spy's message may be read:
"1) It is written in by a loyal agent
and its information is accurate.
"2) It is written by a loyal agent
but its information is only partly
accurate.
"3) It is written by a loyal agent
but its information is entirely
inaccurate.
"4) It is written by a double agent
and its information is entirely false.
"5) It is written by a double agent
and its information is partly true, so
that the false parts will be believed.
"6) It is written by a double agent
and its information is entirely true, so
that the allegiance of the agent will
not be discovered.
"Moreover, the message is written
in code, and liable to the vagaries of
translation. And it is written in a highly
condensed language, whose meanings
can offer varying interpretation. Like a
poem, the message is only as good as
its reader ...
"There is a book to be written on
poetry and espionage. A spy must
know where the best information is,
collect it without being discovered and
safely transmit it."
(From
Eliot Weinberger,
"Tinker, Tailor, Poet, Spy: Tales of
Literary Espionage," New York Times
Book Review, October 4, 1992, p.15.)

DOUBLE GENERATIONS; COLD
WAR I VIETNAM.
In a manner of speaking, the
country has been living a double life
since 1945 and the mixture of the
mythical and political has given us all
the awkward feeling that we're in a
false position. Bill Clinton wants us to
think that he's Kennedy Too and Bush
wants us to think he's Truman Too. As
Tolstoy might have said, all happy
candidates resemble one another;
each unhappy candidate is unhappy in
his own way.
.
There is a symmetry to Bush's
evoking of Truman- the last Cold
Warrior conjuring the ghost of the
first. Beneath the frustration,
boredom, and disgust with the
campaign, and with the country's
position, I believe there is a sense that
Bush's generation has stood its last
watch. Clinton is twenty-two years
younger than Bush and we are now at
one of those generational passing
zones which have marked our politics
on four other occasions.
Kennedy was 27 years younger
than Eisenhower. Teddy Roosevelt was
15 years younger than McKinley.
Lincoln was 18 years younger than
Buchanan. Van Buren was 15 years
younger than Jackson. Between those
zones, the difference in ages between
any two presidents averages about 6.5
years. Even if Bush wins re-election, he
will merely postpone the inevitable
until1996.
How the Viet Nam war
generation will govern is anybody's
guess.
However,
the
private
investigations of Ross Perot in the
1970s and the continuing public
investigations of Senator Kerry into the
status of the POW /MIAs foretell an
accounting. Both those who went to
Viet Nam, and those who protested,
have unfinished business with those
who placed them in false positions. 0
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Happy Anniversary, Anita
and Clarence!
Bruce Berner

Americans have this October
been observing the first anniversary of
the Clarence Thomas Senatorial
confirmation hearings including, of
course, the allegations of sexual
harassment by Professor Anita Hill.
My tender memories of that scene,
1
rivalled only by the soft reminiscences
on my five-year anniversary of rootcanal surgery, are now enriched with a
year of intervening history and the
recent publication of new, intriguing
data.
Since the hearings, much has
been written about their connection to
the rape trials of William Kennedy
Smith and Mike Tyson, the defeat of
Alan Dixon in Illinois, the difficult
fight which Arlen Specter is
encountering in Pennsylvania.
Interesting as these interconnections
are, I am much more impressed by the
apparent effect of the hearings on us

Bruce Berner is Associate Dean of the VU
School of Law, and contributes regularly to
this columnforThe Cresset
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common folk. For example, in the
first nine months of 1991, prior to the
hearings, 4,962 sexual harassment
complaints were filed with the EEOC;
in the same period this year, 7,465
complaints were filed, an increase of
50.4%. And just this week, these
results of a national poll were released:
last October, just after the hearings,
24% believed Professor Hill, 47%
believed Justice (then Judge) Thomas;
now, this October, 44% believe Hill,
34% believe Thomas.
What is
happening here? Did I miss the
release of important new evidence? Is
Anita Hill riding Clinton's coattails? Is
he riding hers? Beguiling as these
political questions are, I have no
intention of addressing them. My
thesis is: regardless of how one sorts
out these socio-political questions,
there is another powerful force at work
among the American people which
can explain part of the puzzle-an
instinct toward forgiveness. Before
developing this theme, let us briefly
revisit last October.
The Thomas-Hill controversy was
heightened by the variety of tightly
interwoven tensions: men and women;
black and white; liberal and
conservative;
republican
and
democrat; supervisor and subordinate
(in the workplace, but easily
generalizable to the schoolplace, the
church place, anyplace). Although
there was already enough for great
theater, when POLITICS and SEX
were added, we got a blockbuster
which held the nation in its grip for

days, even weeks. Weekday soap
operas were preempted with hardly a
howl from their devotees. (The
hearings were, after all, The Mother of
All Soap Operas.) The large audience
share drawn away from the Baseball
Playoffs was a bit harder for me to
understand since baseball fans tend to
prefer lighthearted events with a
simple, clear set of rules and customs.
(As a teacher of Evidence, I am often
questioned by students as to why the
judicial system has to have "so many
picky rules." I used to reply by asking
them to imagine the process without
rules. Now I just tell them to run the
videotapes of the Thomas hearings.)
While
there
was
much
controversy, there was widespread
agreement on some points: the whole
matter was unfortunate; it was
unseemly; it probed all the dark sides
of human nature. The only good
which was identified was the incident's
power to teach us "lessons." As I argue
below, I think the greatest "good" in
the Thomas-Hill hearings is to be
found in the audience, in the
American people. Those who were
supposed to "learn lessons" are doing
some teaching.
This whole controversy was about
SIN. ("Sin" is, however, not a term
often used in a modern, civilized,
secular culture. Nor is it a legal term:
the law calls sins "crimes" or
"violations" or "torts" or "causes of
action".) Senator Grasley from Iowa
(refreshingly, a non-lawyer during a
week when everybody acted like a
The Cresset

lawyer) stated: "I can't help thinking
during this process of that portion of
the Bible which says, 'Let him who is
without sin cast the first stone.'" At
the crass political level, of course, such
was aimed at some Democratic
Committee Members with notoriously
checkered pasts. I'd like to examine it
at a deeper level, not because a
Senator from Iowa said it, but because
Jesus said it: "Let him who is without
sin cast the first stone."
Many of Jesus' earthly remarks
were about the Kingdom of the Right
Hand-the Heavenly Kingdom. They
do not, because they were not
designed to, tell us much about how to
live enmeshed 100% in the Earthly
Kingdom. (The last vineyard owner
who paid all the workers the same
wage regardless of how many hours
they worked is now in federal court
defending a wage violation under the
Federal Fair Labor Standards Act.
And "good Samaritans" were sued so
relentlessly that most states had to pass
special statutes to protect them!) The
reason no one could engage Grasley's
challenge is because the only way fully
to operationalize that biblical passage
in the Senate chamber was to adjourn!
What, no stones? Boy, thatJesus, what
a killjoy!
The law and all of us react to sin
in various ways: detect it; disclose it;
punish it; suffer from it; and, because
legal proceedings have monetary and
human costs, sometimes forget it or
excuse it. There is yet another way.
Let me introduce one new
tension into the Thomas-Hill dramathat between the Left- and Right-hand
Kingdoms, the very tension which
Grasley
references
(perhaps
inadvertently). Tenets of the Left
Hand include: trust nobody, check
everything out.
That kingdom
recognizes as the cardinal sin,
"gullibility," being fooled, being taken
in. The Right Hand kingdom tells us,
among other things: put the best
construction on everything. Now
when Luther said this he did not
mean: "Be a Pollyannish wimp and
believe
everything.
Buy
that
swampland in Florida." He meant that
after full investigation, after using our
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full analytical powers to understand a
problem, when several explanations
become plausible, put the best
construction on everything. Thus, the
Right-hand kingdom recognize
"ungraciousness" as the cardinal sin.
There developed both in the
Senate and in the general public two
intriguing lines of reaction during the
hearings. First, there was the tendency
to "reconcile" the testimony of Hill
and Thomas, to find some explanation
which did not entail branding either
of them a liar. After all, went the
reconcilers, memories fade after such
a long time, two people often interpret
the same data in different ways, some
people are "given to fantasy." The
truth is "somewhere in between." The
left-hand person in me listened to all
this with amusement. "Oh, I see. Two
lawyers.
One says, ' 'Research
subsection (a) of the latest statute on
federal jurisdiction.' The other thinks
he said, 'Want to watch Deep Throat
with me?' Perfectly understandable
mix-up, happens all the time."
IDIOCY! These explanations won't
wash. Either Hill or Thomas was lying
through his or her teeth, and it was a
horrible lie, and it was authored either
by a legal educator or a jurist. It was
not a week for lawyers to feel proud.
Where was Elliot Richardson now that
we needed him again?
Of those willing to concede that
there had to be a liar, many seemed
perfectly willing to proceed as if
neither were. I talked to a few people
who believed Hill, yet still favored
Thomas' appointment Did they think
that sexual harassment and perjury
were not disqualifying? Others who
favored Thomas before the allegations
and believed his denials indicated that
he should not be appointed, "given
the environment." Did they think that
vicious, untrue allegations should be
permitted to disqualify? Many polls
showed this extraordinary disjuncture
between the public's view of who was
lying and its view on confirmation.
And now, a year later, we get another
clue-probably many more people
believed Hill than admitted it then .
Why?
It is possible to see in the

disjuncture, in people's unwillingness
to admit to a disjuncture, and in the
"reconcilers," something quite
positive. In addition to those listed
above, there is another way to react to
sin-it can be forgiven. Would you
concede it is just possible that some
people were struggling to find a way to
articulate that they were willing to
extend forgiveness to the sinners in
this drama, that there was some grace
going on, that a little bit of the Righthand kingdom might just still be active
in this dismal world?
Why then, you may fairly ask,
didn't those people just say that they
were willing to forgive Judge Thomas?
For one thing, grace is not, with rare
exceptions, a permissible reaction for
legal institutions. While judges, jurors,
Senators or others charged with
making legal decisions may wish
personally to forgive, ordinarily it is
not available as a legal solution.
Picture our reaction to a judge saying,
"Well, Mr. Doe, you have been
convicted of armed robbery, but I
think you should only be fined $10
because I'm not a vindi~tive kind of
guy." We readmit criminals to society
after they "pay their debt to society."
We "forgive" only after such has been
earned. The justice system works hard
to assure that everyone gets what he
deserves whether those deserts be
rewards or punishments. That effort
cannot be coherently derailed by
grace. Gospel is alien in such context
The few examples in which
"forgiveness" or "mercy" are legally
recognized-pardon, commutation,
clemency-are only barely tolerated
and usually exercised at grave political
risk. Persons, therefore, with official
responsibilities who want to forgive
conduct must not ordinarily articulate
such as the reason for decision.
Secondly, at the purely personal
level, articulating a willingness to
forgive certain sins these days may be
widely viewed as politically incorrect.
People are very invested in punishing
sins such as lying and sexual
harassment. Many people on either
side of the Thomas-Hill question will
react to forgiveness of the other with
honest anger. If you announce to
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them that you are willing to extend
forgiveness to Thomas or Hill, you are
open to the challenge that you are
trivializing the offense, have
insufficient empathy for its victim,
insufficient outrage at its perpetrator.
And those challenges are not
unfounded. It is imperative that I
admit a huge caveat to my argument:
hypocrites use the vocabulary of
forgiveness to mask disdain for the
plight of the victims of sin. The net
effect is that many people not directly
victimized by sin feel uncomfortable in
stating that they are willing to forgive
the wrongdoings of others. And, in a
strict sense, human beings cannot ever
claim to "forgive sin" without
arrogating to themselves the power of
God.
Forgiving, even in the looser,
human sense, is not the same as
forgetting. Forgiving does not mean
to come to believe the sin did not
occur, but to act as if it did not. And,
of course, that is just what I argue

many people have been trying to do.
God does not blot sin from his
memory (indeed, it is nonsense to talk
of an omniscient personality forgetting
anything), he removes its effect, its
consequences, its wages through
forgiveness.
Neither is forgiveness the same as
condonation. If you argue that people
cannot be truly forgiven until they
acknowledge and repent of their sin, I
would agree. Forgiveness to be
complete requires this mutuality;
condonation does not. However, and
this is crucial to my point, the grace of
the forgiver, the readiness to forgive if
only the sinner c<H>perates, is no less
because the sinner will not accept it.
You may, of course, reject a gift, but
your doing so does not detract from
the goodness of the person who offers
it. That any of the actors in this drama
will ever come forward and admit
wrongdoing and ask public forgiveness
is quite unlikely. My point only is that
I detect in some of the public reaction

a willingness to extend that
forgiveness.
And if you think that I'm totally
wrong, that "the nation" or "some
people" or "you" are not ready to
forgive the sinners in this drama any
more than those in the dramas of our
everyday lives, you could be right.
We're only human. We have agendas.
We're all either men or women, black
or white, liberal or conservative,
republican or democrat, supervisor or
subordinate. We can't always forgive.
At least, not yet, not today. And some
sins seem unforgivable. For the
sinners who fear that human
forgiveness will not be forthcoming,
there is, after all, another place to
turn.
But I don't think I'm wholly
wrong. I think there is a substantial
collective readiness to forgive. In the
world there are, to be sure, People of
the the World. Yet, amidst roiling
modernity, there are, still, People of
the Book. 0

In the Spirit of James Whitcomb Riley
Whose face is that that burns slow in the night?
It's surely not the moon, my friend, beware!
She might look back and freeze your heart so fast
that blood beats on a moment with no pump,
by habit only. There! That's what she is!
A revenant, in layman's terms 'deceased,'
but doesn't know yet that she's got to stop.
And yet she's just as friendly as she was
last week outside of church when you shook hands
and said she sang real pretty with the choir.
Listen! I think she's just about to moan!
James Clifton Hale
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White Nights and
Computers
Bill Marion
The air was cool, even for an
early July day in St. Petersburg, when
the overnight train from Moscow
pulled in to the train station at about
7:30 a.m. Tired and excited, we
Americans-10 adults and 13
teenagers-were greeted by a small
group of Russians who acted as a
welcoming committee. For the next
five days we would be their guests both
in St. Petersburg and in Sosnovy Bor, a
small town located on the Gulf of
Finland about 90 kilometers east.
All of us-suitcases, computers
and people-piled into a bus for a
quick tour of St. Petersburg, a short
stop to stroll in the gardens of
Peterhof, the Summer Palace of the
Czars, and a bumpy ride along the
pitted road to Sosnovy Bor. More
Russians, a sumptuous dinner and the
formality of an opening ceremony
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awaited us there. As we rolled on, the
lively yet nervous getting-to-know-you
chatter could be heard above the roar
of the bus engine. It was interrupted
only by the voice
of our
interpreter /guide, Tatiana Talalaeva,
as she pointed out a number of sights
along the way.
When we arrived in Sosnovy Bor,
we dragged all of our paraphernalia to
a dormitory-like building, quickly
splashed our faces with water and
hurried to a restaurant hall for a
hearty Russian welcome- about 70
people in all were served a traditional
Russian sit-down dinner. The first
phase of a Russian-American
"summer" exchange program was
officially christened with appropriate
speeches and toasts by dignitaries on
both sides.
(The Russians are
expected to visit the US in the early
spring of 1993.) The exchange is part
of an educational initiative to further
global communications between
secondary school students in America
and in Russia. These students, under
the guidance of their teachers, will
work jointly on some agreed upon,
long-term educational projects.
Communication will take place
through computers, international
electronic mail networks and on-site
summer camps.
However, it is not the proposed
educational program per se that I want
to talk about in the remainder of this
letter. As I am spending two weeks
with Russian teenagers this summer,
(the second week will be spent in
Pushchino, a town outside of Moscow)
I have been asking myself the
question: What is it like to be a
teenager in Russia in the year 1992?
My response will focus mainly on my

experiences with the teenagers in St.
Petersburg and Sosnovy Bor. Given
the tremendous changes and resulting
turmoil that the Russian people have
experienced in the past few years, one
would expect a teenager's life to be
rather chaotic. But, I found that, for
the most part, not to be the case; they
seemed in many ways like the
American teens who accompanied us.
For one thing, with hormones flowing
in all directions, the Russian teens
were wrestling with the same issues of
self-identity as any 14-17 year old
would. A number of examples spring
to mind to illustrate this point
In the evening of the day of our
arrival in Sosnovy Bor some of the
young Russians invited us--both adults
and teens-on a walk through the
town to see the Gulf of Finland. It was
about 10:00 p.m. and the Gulf was
about one and a half miles from the
dorm. In this part of the world the
night is still young-the white nights
are for real, and, since private
ownership of cars is practically nonexistent, walking is no big deal. So, a
few of us heartier souls accepted the
invitation. During our stroll through
the town, the Russians were eager to
point out some of the sights that
brought meaning to their young lives:
the row upon row of apartment
buildings where they lived with their
parents, a small open-air playgroundlike structure which had been carved
out of stone (I suspected that this
might be a favorite teen hangout) and
the beautiful and serene wooded areas
which engulfed the town. As we
walked, I asked a few of the young girls
about some of the things they like to
do for fun. Their response was not
unexpected. They enjoyed listening to
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music-rock, classical and, even rap-dancing, walking through the woods
and sunbathing on the beaches of the
Gulf. In addition, they indicated that
they very much liked being a part of an
after-school program, called the Young
Managers &hool, at which they learn
about business and fashion. This
school program was developed by a
research scientist, Nina Kirpichnikova.
And, of course, they said they liked
talking to Americans.
As the conversation continued,
along the lines of who were some of
their favorite rock stars and rock
groups--British and American
singers, Elvis, the Beatles, Madonna
and Paula Abdul won out along with
the Russian groups, Kino and
Aquarium-we were joined by a group
of young Russian teenage boys, some
of whom, it quickly became clear, were
the boyfriends of some of the girls. I
was an observer to a centuries-old
ritual, young teenagers in love.
Suddenly the heavens opened up and
we all ran for cover. A few of us hid
under a wooden bridge in the woods
(not a particularly bright idea since
thunder and lightning accompanied
the storm) and laughed and talked
until the rains subsided to a drizzle. At
that point we decided to make our way
back to the dorm. It really didn't
matter that I didn't get to the Gulf that
evening because I was part of a shared
experience with Russian teenagers.
The next evening we did go to
the Gulf of Finland, this time by bus.
A party had been planned by our
Russian hosts at a dacha just a few
yards from the beach. The evening's
festivities began around 10:30. First
up was a fashion show. The wooden
walkway leading up to the front door
of the dacha became the runway and
the night lit the stage. About seven of
the Russian girls, who appeared to me
to be around ten feet tall, modeled
beautiful and colorful dresses and
skirt/blouse combinations which they
themselves had designed. To the
delight of all, but especially to our
young boys, the girls put on quite a
show. After this great start to the
evening we all proceeded indoors.
There was much milling around until
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one of the adults announced that the
next event would be a sandwichmaking con test. The young people
would be players and the adults would
be judges.
On a long table in the middle of
a rather large room, traditional
Russian bread and cold cuts were
spread out. Candles provided the
light. What a pretty table-setting! But,
it was hard to hold back the hungry
teens from devouring the props before
the contest began. Boys and girls,
individually and in teams, got into the
spirit of the game and within fifteen
minutes had produced delectable
feasts. Soon winners were announced
for the most colorful sandwich, the
tallest sandwich, the most decorative
sandwich, the sandwich which used the
most ingredients, etc. After prizes
were awarded-one Russian girl came
away with three of them-everyone
partook of the fruits of the teenagers'
labor. Since it was getting pretty late
and half the group had to pack for a
three-day stay in St. Petersburg, the
party lasted for only another half-hour.
But that was enough time for people
to roam on the beach or take a stroll
in the woods around the dacha. What
a picture-perfect ending to the
evening! (As we say in America,
"another Kodak moment.")
For those of us who remained in
Sosnovy Bor the next morning was a
time of work. We went to the Young
Managers School to continue work on
a Private Enterprise Project. The
assignment was to build a price
comparison model for some common
goods which were available both in
Russia and in the United States.
Obviously this could not be done in
one day, but some data could be
gathered by visiting a couple of the
local shops in Sosnovy Bor. So, off
went about twelve Russian and
American students with the Russians
acting as guides and interpreters. The
young group treated the assignment as
if they were on a scavenger hunt.
When they arrived back at the school
an hour or so later, they brought back
with them some useful information
and even a few snacks-leave it to
teenagers to find food. A common

bond was forming among the young
people and it was a delight to see.
The last two days in Sosnovy Bor
found us travelling back and forth to
St. Petersburg for sight-seeing and
other cultural activities. On the last
two nights we Americans had a
chance to participate in an intimate
part of Russian life, a home-stay. Each
of us was issued a personal invitation
by one Russian host to spend two
nights in a home-teens were paired
with teens and adults with adults.
What a marvelous experience! All of
us were treated grandly-food,
conversation, laughter, watching T.V.,
listening to music-almost as if we
indeed were members of the families
who hosted us. The Russian homes
are really small apartments, or flats.
There are fewer rooms than are
necessary for comfortable living. We
were told of a rule, called the "minus
one" rule, which is sometimes used to
allocate space in apartment buildings.
Each family receives a flat which has
one less room than the number of
people in the family. However, the
families were not embarrassed to show
off their homes and their children.
It's been said that the Russian people
really enjoy their kids and nothing we
experienced disabused us of that
notion.
Despite the appearance of a
natural flow to a Russian teenager's
life which comes through in the stories
just
told,
there
are
many
contradictions. For one, it's not clear
whether the teens believe that
education provides any hope for the
future. They see many, many young
people in the streets of the large cities
selling all types of goods-and making
big bucks fast. They know that some
of it is organized and controlled by
criminal elements and, yet, they yearn
for a piece of the "good" life. Even as
these young people participate in an
after-school program to learn about
business, they wonder whether the
economic chaos they see around them
will destroy any opportunities which
education might bring them.
A second contradiction has to do
with their feelings toward democracy.
If you ask these young people if they
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are concerned that communism will
rear its ugly head again in Russia, you
receive an emphatic "No." Since the
failure of the August 1991 coup,
Russian youth, much more so than
their parents, seem to believe that the
people will resist any attempt to
overthrow the democratic gains their
country has made. And, yet, there is
cynicism about whether any system of
government, especially democracy, for
which the country has few traditions,
will make a difference. Communism
preached the hope of the state to solve
people's problems and to bring about
some sort of utopia. Now that the
young people see that that promise
was threadbare there is profound
disillusionment with any role for the
state in affecting peoples lives for the
good.
On Sunday evening the whole
American group left St. Petersburg for
Moscow on an overnight train. But
before we said our goodbyes at the
train station, with tears, hugs and
assurances of continued contact, we
all attended a closing ceremony at a
school in St. Petersburg. After the
speeches, toasts and one final meal,
the teenagers adjourned to a large
classroom. For an hour and a half, as
a Russian deejay spun records, mainly
American rock and rap, the teens
danced. No one needed lessons.
Meanwhile the adults moved to the
school director's office for some final
discussion and toasts. However, a few
of us could feel the music moving
through our veins and after a short
time joined the young people. Were
they surprised that some of us adults
still had something left! We could
dance to rock and roll and didn't need
lessons either. Perhaps they were
surprised that the dialectic of history
had not left the past entirely without
capacity to operate in the present. 0
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Carl E. Braaten. No Other Gospel!
Christianity Among the World's Religions.
Minneapolis: Fortress Press, 1992. pp.
160. $10.95.
With the title, No Other Gospel!,
Carl Braaten signals to the reader that
this book will take a strong stand on
the uniqueness of Christian truth over
against other religions. The title is
reminiscent of titles by Paul Knitter,
No Other Name?, and by John Hick, God
Has Many Names. And in fact it seems
that Knitter and Hick are Braaten's key
antagonists, appearing in nearly every
chapter as key representatives of what
Braaten calls the pluralistic theology of
religions. This is a view which,
according to Braaten, places
Christianity on a par with all other
religions by putting God rather than
Christ at the center of faith, and by
seeing Christ as one savior among
many. Braaten answers with a loud
"No!"
This is a collection of papers
delivered to various audiences over the
past five years, and they contain a
mixed bag of colorful, sarcastic attacks
on a variety of pluralistic theologians
together with deep insights and

compelling articulations of the
Lutheran confessional tradition.
Braaten is not dull reading. Christian
theology is today teetering on the
brink of suicidal confusion, he cries.
The new pluralistic theology of
religions is spreading like wildfire in
academic and ecumenical circles,
Braaten warns, and if it gains
ascendancy it will be the death of the
ecumenical and missionary movement.
This theology is a deluge of neoGnosticism, a new edition of Arianism,
presenting an Ebionite Jesus, a Docetic
Christ. Ultimately it gives us a
Christless God, that is, a hidden God
whose hind parts are indistinguishable
from the face of the devil. And the old
ghost of Feuerbach, grinning from ear
to ear, has taken charge of this new
theology, in Braaten's view.
Braaten's foes are legion.
Besides Knitter and Hick, the list
sometimes includes Tom Driver,
Rosemary Reuther, Dorothy Soelle,
James Gustafson, Raimundo Panikkar,
David Tracy, Langdon Gilkey, Gordon
Kaufman, Schubert Ogden, John
Cobb, Sallie McFague, and Mark
Taylor-as theologians who lapse into
"mere monotheism" because they do
not start from salvation-historical
Christology, shifting in one way or
another to a theology in which Christ
is simply a satellite in a galaxy of
religious superstars.
Even though Braaten separates
himself sharply from
liberal
theological pluralism, he also is critical
of the narrow particularities of
fundamentalism. With his emphasis
on the eschatological fulfillment of all
creation in Christ, Braaten argues for
the possibility of universal salvation,
grounded in the Biblical vision of the
eschatological consummation. With
that eschatological perspective, he can
be amazingly open to other religions.
The New Testament does not claim
Christ as the only revelation, Braaten
points out.
Every religion has
prophets and revelation, and we
should take seriously all that humans
have experienced and believed about
God. Each religion offers its own type
of salvation, and the dialogue between
the religions discloses the sacred and
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saving mystery that lies within the
horizon of each religious tradition.
According to Braaten, Christians are
not pitted against other religions, for
all
religions
are
open
to
transformation toward a future. And
the role of the Christian mission is to
interact with other religions to bring
an encounter with the Christian
message, to create space in them for a
future that will not negate but will
fulflll them.
But in spite of such seeming
openness to the religions, Braaten
makes an absolute distinction between
such general revelation found in the
other religions and the saving reality
of Christ. Ultimately, he says, the
religions operate under God's Law,
not the Gospel. The religions, just like
all other human activities, fall under
the wrath and judgment of God. Since
all the religions share in the universal
human condition of sin, they cannot
serve as a means of deliverance; the
final word of hope comes to the
religions and not through the
religions.
There are interesting flashes of
insight in Braaten's essays, helpful
challenges and suggestions. Braaten
points out, for example, the strong
possibility of a link between strong
monotheism and patriachialism. If
god is thought of as a monarch, then
the monarchical episcopate becomes
the governing model of the church.
Perhaps,
Braaten
suggests,
monotheistic monarchianism not only
dominates the doctrine of God but
also undergirds the patriarchal system
of human relationships. As a socially
constructed image of authority and
unity, it may lie at the root of the
religion of patriarchy. In contrast to
such monotheistic monarchianism,
Braaten suggests, if the Trinity is seen
as the ultimate ground of all reality,
this provides a unity that gives ultimate
value to relationship, reciprocity, and
mutuality between members in a
loving communion of equals.
In another bit of good advice,
Braaten argues that the project of
finding Christian ideas behind every
bush in other religions is a most
questionable enterprise. This is, for
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example, a problem of the Logos
Christology which co-opts other
religions by seeing them as diverse
expressions of the one Logos. In this
way, Braaten rightly says, other
religions become mere echoes of seeds
from plants grown in our own garden.
Braaten , however, fails to carry
these challenging ideas forward into a
real discussion of Christianity among
the world religions. In the only essay
in which Braaten actually takes up
teachings from the other religions, he
looks at them insofar as they have
some Christ-like ideas in them. His
discussion is climaxed by a comparison
of the twisted figure of Jesus hanging
on the cross and the smiling Buddha
sitting on a lotus blossom-a cheap
way to show the superiority of
Christianity while neglecting the real
depths of Buddhism.
I look forward to Braaten really
grappling with Christianity among the
world religions as those religions
actually are, not as Christians project
them. Braaten could carry forth his
ideas to help construct a Christian
theology that is responsive to the
world's religions, that actually learns
something about God and the world
from them. In the process, surely, the
Christian understanding of what
salvation means would be deepened
also.
Ted Ludwig

Kenneth E. Bailey. Finding the Lost:
Cultural Keys to Luke 15. St. Louis:
Concordia Publishing House. pp. 232.
Dr. Bailey has spent the past 35
years teaching in Egypt, the Lebanon,
and Cyprus. During those years he has
developed an interest in, and
thorough knowledge of, the culture of
the Middle East, a culture that has, in
important respects, been slow to
change and that consequently is much
the same as it was in the days of Jesus.
During those years he has also
developed what he calls a "love affair"
with the parables of Luke 15: the Lost
Sheep, the Lost Coin, and the Two

Lost Brothers (as he calls it). This
book is his most recent attempt to
understand these parables in terms of
the Middle Eastern culture in which
they had their origin, and it represents
the culminating synthesis of a series of
publications on the subject that
extends back to 1973, when he wrote
The Cross and the Prodigal (CPH, 1973).
Finding the Lost is a stunning
achievement.
Like every Biblical scholar, Dr.
Bailey wants "to discover as precisely as
possible the original intent of Jesus of
Nazareth as he created the parables
recorded in Luke 15." But that aim
has traditionally been frustrated, he
claims, by two features of the way in
which Western
theology has
developed. The first one is that, in the
West, we have given pride of the
theological place to doctrinal,
conceptual systems of thought;
consequently we have lost our sense of
theology as metaphor and our feel for
story. The second feature of our
Western debility is our estrangement
from the Semitic culture of Jesus
specifically, as well as from the Middle
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Eastern world more generally.
In his effort to help the Western
reader overcome these deficiencies,
Dr. Bailey offers a most instructive
example of rhetorical analysis of these
parables as story. So, for example, in
the parable of the Two Lost Sons, the
story of the older brother employs a
structure that is incomplete. The last
stanza is missing, "because the
audience, now on stage, must finish
the unfinished play." One can guess
the appropriate and desired ending,
but the hearer will have to write it with
his or her own biography. While one
could conceptualize a corresponding
idea, the immediacy and the impact of
the parable as story would be lost.
Similarly, his line by line, often
word by word, interpretation of the
text from the perspective of his
cultural analysis not only sharpens our
traditional understanding, but also
expands them in new and creative
ways. And the persuasiveness of his
cultural analysis is strengthened
considerably by frequent citations (in
translation) from seven ancient
Semitic versions of the new Testament:
three from the ancient Syriac
community, all dating prior to 614
A.D., and four Greek-to-Arabic
versions, all dating from the ninth and
tenth centuries of the common era.
Thus furnished from these sources
with the native cultural background, it
is possible, for example, more
completely to measure the costly love
of the father, both for the younger
brother and for the older brother.
And the Western reader will be
startled to discover that the feast at the
return of the prodigal was not held in
honor of the prodigal, but rather as a
celebration of the father's joy in
recovering his son with shalom.
Readers may also be interested in
Dr. Bailey's discussion of the gender
issues in these parables. On the one
hand, he notes thatJesus draws equally
from the world of men and of women
in his parables. "Jesus is rare, if not
unique, in this regard" (p. 94). But on
the other hand, he defends the
propriety of calling God "Father" and
not also "Mother," partly in order to
avoid introducing sexuality and
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notions of sacred prostitution into the
notion of God, and partly in order to
avoid compromising the unity of God.
Thus, although God is called "Father,"
that Father is described as having the
finest qualities of both a father and a
mother.
Dr. Bailey devotes a final chapter
to drawing together a list of thirteen
parallels, or comparisons, between
Luke 15 and Psalm 23. Some of them
seem to me to be a bit contrived; there
are, after all, some persistent themes,
like danger and survival, which appear
throughout the Bible. Others are
more illuminating; for example, the
Good Father "prepared a table for his
lost son in the presence of his
enemies," namely, in the presence of
those who, apart from the intervention
of the father, would legitimately
regard the prodigal son as an enemy
for the shameful way in which he
shredded the fabric of their
community.
In summation, this is a fine book,
a "must" for all those who need to
deepen their insight into these
beloved parables.
Concordia
Publishing House
is
to
be
congratulated for this addition to their
series on Concordia Scholarship
Today, not least because it wears its
evident scholarship lightly in the
interest of instructing, even edifYing,
its readers. I will find it impossible to
teach the parables of Luke 15 again
without reference to this volume.
Walter E. Keller

Mark A. Noll, ed. Confessions and
Catechisms of the Reformation. Grand
Rapids: Baker Book House, 1991. 232
pp. $12.95.
Jerry K. Robbins, ed. The Essential
Luther, A Reader on Scripture,
Redemption, and Society. Grand Rapids:
Baker Book House, 1991. pp. 112.
$7.95.
Alex Haley died the week I began
to read these two books. It occurred
to me that such volumes resemble

family albums. They help recall and
trace our roots. They help focus our
own identity as we focus on the
identity of the family and upon its
roots.
Unfortunately, The Essential
Luther is full of fuzzy pictures. The
resemblance is there, but too often
where you'd have liked to have had a
zoom lens, there is enough blur to
make for an uncertain image.
The method of presentation is
intriguing, a m~x of original sourcescitations of Lu~er-not badly chosen,
and commentary. The pictures are
well-selected, divided into three
groups: Biblical interpretation,
redemption, Christian living in society.
But the author/editor ventures too
often into the naive, the insufficient
treatment, or the perversion of the
message.
It is naive to assert that Luther's
Temporal Authority is "the first defense
of temporal authority against the
medieval policy of subordinating the
state to the church" (63), given a
healthy medieval tradition of protest
against the particular papal program.
Insufficient, for example, is the
explanation of Luther's concepts of
the two realms or governments and of
the Christian calling(s) in daily life.
Unfortunate is a summary of Luther's
understanding of the atonement
which is heavily Anselmian and thus
fails to capture the full dynamic of
Luther's rich use of many Biblical
presentations of the atonement (5255). Just plain wrong is the author's
assertion that Luther taught that "alien
righteousness" "saves us from original
sin" and "proper righteousness" "saves
us from 'actual sin'" (58). It is against
such muddled thinking that Luther
revolted. Who could find Luther's
understanding of faith as the trusting
response to God's promise in the
description, "Faith is letting God give
Christ's merits to us. Indeed, faith is
another way of saying Christ in us, that
the Christ who is for humankind is for
us in particular. Faith justifies because
it is equivalent to Christ, or it is the
way Christ can give himself to us"
(56)! Better family albums exist and
depict our roots in far better focus and
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with far greater accuracy.
Confessions and Catechisms of the
Reformation presents the extended
family, the whole neighborhood,
almost the entire Christian village as it
presented itself in the sixteenth
century. It is a series of self-portraits,
ten documents from the Reformation
era which let the confessors and
theologians of that time tell us of their
own faith. Luther's Ninety-five Theses
(the least important of the documents
in terms of its theological contentalthough as the cause of the first
modern media event it perhaps
deserves a quick reading), his small
Catechism, and the Augsburg
Confession represents the Lutheran
confession of the faith. Zwingli's Sixtyseven
Articles,
the
Genevan
Confession of 1536, and the
Heidelberg Catechism offer the
"Reformed" confession.
The
Anglicans' Thirty-Nine Articles of 1571
and the Anabaptist Schleitheim
Confession give readers a glimpse of
those traditions. Roman Catholicism
is represented in selections from the
canons and decrees of the Council of
Trent and the Profession of the
Tridentine Faith of 1564.
Crisp, succinct, insightful
introductions help the reader into the
documents,
and
very
brief
bibliographies suggest further sources
of information on the documents and
their historical context.
Returning to our roots always
helps fix the compass and refresh our
sense of our own identities. It is
important for individual Christian
readers and for congregational classes
to search what is written about the
roots of their own traditions. Noll's
volume could be useful in doing just
that; Robbins' will not provide help in
such pursuit.
Robert Kolb

Episcopacy: Lutheran- United Methodist
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Dialogue II. Jack M. Tuell, Roger W.
Fjeld, editors. Augsburg-Fortress,
1991. pp. 128. $7.95.
Who says that churches are too
resistant to change? This year, three
Methodist women and one Lutheran
in America were elected to the office
of bishop. Few people were astonished
or perturbed. Even the Anglicans have
opened not only the function but the
order of episcopacy to women. These
breaks with ancient Church tradition
and denominational traditions were
made despite the formal bilateral
dialogues involving Roman Catholics,
Eastern
Orthodox,
Anglicans,
Lutherans and Methodists. While all
these many dialogues are motivated by
the ecumenical quest for church unity,
they can also work against one
another. As with other issues of
doctrine and church polity, the
question about episcopacy is this: is it
a theologically solid and nonnegotiable cause for division, or just a
diversity of organization and practical
economy?
Two points of agreement are
prominent in the common statement
on episcopacy produced after six
meetings
between
appointed
representatives of the Lutheran
Council in the U.S.A. and the United
Methodist Church. Both are negative.
The first rejects the doctrine of the
bishop as an order of ministry in
distinction from the diaconate and
presbyterate. The second asserts that
episcopacy is not of the essence of the
Church.
The function of episcope, or
oversight, or superintendency is
readily accepted as necessary.
Oversight is not only for the whole
church but is administered by the
whole church, all accountable to the
Word of God. Very good! But for
what theological reason does the office
of bishop en tail the distinctive and
primary accountability for the church's
mission and ministry?
Does the title matter? Would the
late Dr. Franklin Clark Fry have been
more of an episcopal leader if he had
been "consecrated" (methodist term)
a bishop rather than elected a church

president? American Lutherans are
still adjusting to the episcopal
nomenclature. Methodists have had it
for two hundred years, but are not
quite certain what it means.
The statement acknowledges the
importance for the reconsideration of
episcopacy on
three broadly
ecumenical efforts to find both
clarification and unity: namely, the
World Council of Churches'
document on Baptism, Eucharist and
Ministry, the Consultation on Church
Union's COCU Consensus, and
various bilateral dialogue reports. The
first two of these make strong cases for
the three-fold ministry of deacon,
presbyter and bishop as the best forms,
with clear justification for the
episcopal office. It is remarkable that
the teams which wrote the present
statement shunned the opportunity to
profit by these comprehensive efforts.
However, some of the essays which are
included in this book, especially those
by Gerald R. Moede and Roy I. Sano,
point to the rich insights to be found
m
the
wider
ecumenical
documentation.
Formal dialogues are not
negotiations for either pulpit and altar
fellowship or church union. They are
exploratory. Some lead to concrete
agreements to give expression to interchurch unity short of union. The
Lutheran and Episcopal churches are
on this track, but not the Methodist
church as yet. Is there a serious
intention to move closer? We might
hope so. This book also includes the
text of a common Lutheran-Methodist
statement on Baptism, reached in
1979. Although episcopacy is not a big
issue between these denominations, it
is worthwhile to have had the
dialogue. If the unitive intention is
really serious, let the dialogues
continue.

J. Robert Nelson

John Corrigan.

The Prism of Piety:
The Cresset

Catholick Congregational Clergy at the
Beginning of the Enlightenment. Oxford
University Press, 1991. pp. 256.

$32.50.
Patrick Collinson, the premier
historian of English Protestantism,
once remarked that English historians
believe that Puritanism ended at the
Restoration but have no idea when it
started while American historians are
certain that their Puritanism began at
Plymouth Rock but cannot find when
it disappeared. His aphorism points to
the underlying truth that Puritanism
was one expression of the recurring
and ancient Christian tradition Perry
Miller called the "Augustinian strain of
piety." Thus, strictly defining the
beginnings and endings of Puritanism
will always be, at this deeper level, a
fool's errand. Amongst virtually any
group of Christians at any time there
will be those who are dazzled by the
omnipotence of God, oppressed by the
horrors of original sin, and bent on
reform.
The subject of this book is the
theology of a set of Boston area
congregational clerics (Benjamin
Coleman, Benjamin Wadsworth,
Thomas
Foxcroft,
Ebenezer

Pemberton, Nathaniel Appleton,
William Brattle, and Edward Holyoke)
of the early eighteenth century who
sought to reconcile the earlier Puritan
tradition with Enlightenment ideas.
The author, who is the Andrew P.
Mellon Faculty Fellow at Harvard,
prefers the description "Catholick,"
which the ministers themselves used,
to the more common "liberal" .s o as to
obviate the frequent assumption that
these men were abandoning Calvinism
and becoming the forerunners of
Unitarianism. Rather he stresses their
"catholick" inclusive and moderate via
media between the rationalistic thrust
of such figures as Ebenezer Gay and
John Barnard and their more
traditional contemporaries Cotton
Mather, John Webb, and Mather Byles.
A model of crisp clarity requiring
only 134 pages of prose, the analysis
proceeds through five chapters, each
embracing one major theme. The first
relates these thinkers to the English
latitudinarian movement. The second
concerns their cosmology as they
turned from the metaphor of
"wilderness" so crucial to the first
generations of American Puritans to a
more Newtonian and benevolent view
of nature. The third theme was their

understanding, based partly on the
Cambridge Platonists, of "the body as
partner to the soul, and the affections
as a partner to reason" (p. 6). This
opening to "sensibility" was a major
element of eighteenth century
theology and ethics. The fourth, and
proof of their continuing Calvinist
orthodoxy, was their emphasis on the
ravages of original sin and the
necessity of the covenant of grace for
salvation. The final chapter deftly
describes their ecclesiology and ethics.
As in his book on Charles
Chauncey and Jon a than Mayhew
(1987), John Corrigan evinces a gift
for explication and analysis of
eighteenth century New England's
religious thought that is both rare and
useful. He demonstrates in this work
the continuing vitality of American
Calvinism into what used to be called
its "glacial age" and thus confirms the
wisdom of Collinson's aphorism. This
is, in short, a fine book and should be
read by all interested in the
intellectual and religious history of
early America.

Richard P. Gildrie

Notes on PoetsRobert Siegel teaches at the University
of University of Wisconsin-Milwaukee,
where he directs the Graduate
Creative Writing Program . His
collections of poetry include The Beasts
and the Elders and In A Pig's Eye. In
addition, he is the author of Whalesong,
and its recent sequel White Whale,
published by Harper San Francisco.
The Cresset is particularly pleased to
publish these poems in conjunction
with Mr. Siegel's November visit to
campus. His poem "Blackbird" will
appear in a forthcoming anthology
from MacMillan called Redeem the Time.

0 $8.50 per year

James Clifton Hale is a graduate of
VU, now working as a reporter and
news editor for the Chesterton Tribune.
He writes poetry and fiction, though
he would prefer to have done so
before 1830.
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